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SCHEHEREZADE MEETS KAFKA: TWO DOZEN
SORDID TALES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION
SUSAN M. AKRAM*

"The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men,
because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the
meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected
and uncorrected."**
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than two dozen immigrants' in the United States are facing deportation2 or removal 3 proceedings based primarily on evidence that the Immigra-

* Associate Clinical Professor of Immigration and Comparative Refugee Law, Boston University
School of Law; Supervising Attorney, Boston University Civil Litigation Program; lead counsel on BIA
appeal and co-counsel with Malea Kiblan in federal court litigation of one of the secret evidence cases,
Anwar Haddam v. INS, the main case illustrated in this article; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
The author thanks attorneys Malea Kiblan and Mary Mourra Ramadan for their zealous representation of
Anwar Haddam at the immigration trial level, and for the strong record they created for appeal. She also
thanks Georgetown Immigration Law Journal Managing Editor Aimen Mir for his tireless work making it
possible to publish this article, and Boston University law students Dina D'Avirro and Cesar Temieden for
their invaluable assistance. This article is dedicated to the tenacious lawyers representing the respondents
in the secret evidence cases.
** Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
I. This article uses the terms "aliens" and "immigrants" interchangeably for ease of reference,
although they refer to technically different types of status in immigration law. An alien is an individual
who is not a U.S. citizen, but may or may not be a lawful permanent resident alien ("green-card" holder).
An immigrant is one who has obtained an immigrant visa, in contrast to a non-immigrant who may have
any one of over 30 types of temporary visa statuses. An alien or an immigrant may also include, in lay
speech, an individual who does not have a legally-recognized status under current U.S. immigration law.
Where necessary, the distinctions between the types of status held by the individuals involved in cases
discussed in this article are clarified.
2. The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (HRIRA), restructured the
proceedings by which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could remove an alien from the
United States. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title Il, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-587 (1996). Prior to IIRIRA, the INS
would seek removal either at exclusion or deportation hearings before an administrative law judge in an
immigration court. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §§ 212, 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1229a,
amended by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title Ill, §§ 301, 304, 110 Stat. 3009-575, 587-97 (1996).
The distinction between deportation and exclusion was critical, because case-law established that
constitutional guarantees were more fully available to individuals in deportation proceedings as compared
to those in exclusion proceedings. The critical difference rested on the concept of "entry": an individual
was guaranteed constitutional rights if he had "entered" the U.S. as that concept was defined by U.S.
immigration law, but was not entitled to such rights if he was at the border seeking admission. Many of the
pending secret evidence cases were brought under the law as it was before IIRIRA, which means the
distinction remains critical despite the amendments to the INA.
3. IIRIRA replaced the earlier system of exclusion and deportation proceedings with a single
"removal" hearing for both deportability and inadmissibility. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (1999).
Despite the change in nomenclature and in what triggers the types of rights afforded to the alien,
immigration lawyers still use the old concepts of deportation and exclusion. In this article, the terms

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:51

tion and Naturalization
Service ("INS") has refused to disclose because it is
"classified.", 4 The use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings is the
most powerful tool in an apparently systematic attack by U.S. governmental
agencies on the speech, association and religious activities of a very defined
group of people: Muslims, Arabs, and U.S. lawful permanent residents of
Arab origin residing in this country. Evidence emerging from these cases
removal and deportation are used interchangeably, but the term "exclusion" is used when that specific
proceeding is involved.
4. According to INS General Counsel Paul Virtue, "there are some 25 cases that are currently pending
in which classified information was submitted." The NationalSecurity ConsiderationsInvolved in Asylum
Applications: HearingsBefore the Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, 105th Cong. (FDCH Political Transcripts, October 8, 1998) (testimony of Paul Virtue,
INS General Counsel) [hereinafter Virtue Testimony].
Among the individuals who have recently faced or are currently facing deportation, exclusion or
removal proceedings on the basis of secret evidence are: Ali Termos (Lebanese citizen, deported to
Lebanon on the basis of secret evidence); Imad Hamad (stateless Palestinian, born in Lebanon); Yahia
Meddah (Algerian, escaped detention and apparently fled the United States); Shareef Fares Ibrahim
Al-Ashhab; Hamzeh Ibrahim Khalid E1-Natsheh; Nasser Ahmed (Egyptian); Hany Kiareldeen (stateless
Palestinian, last residing in Jordan, U.S. lawful permanent resident); Mazen A1-Najjar (stateless Palestinian, last residing in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.); Suleiman Shahadeh (stateless Palestinian, excluded and
deported); the Iraqis: Mohammed Jwer Al-Ammary, Ali Jahjoh Saleh, Adil Hadi Awadh, Mohammed
Jassin Tuma, Ali Yassin Mohammed-Karim, Mohammed Yassin Mohammed Karim, Safa Al-Din Hassan
Al-Batat, Haidar Al-Bandar, Hashim Qadir Hawlery; the LA 8: Khader Musa Hamide (Jordanian national,
U.S. lawful permanent resident for 16 years before the proceedings) and his wife, Julie Nyangugi Mungai
(citizen of Kenya), Ibrahim Nasif (Michel) Shahadeh (stateless Palestinian, Jordanian citizen and U.S.
lawful permanent resident), Bashar Husain Amer, Amjad Mustafa Obeid, Ayman Mustafa Obeid, Aiad
Khaled Barakat (all stateless Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship), and Naim Nadim Sharif (a stateless
Palestinian from the West Bank). Case documents on file with Kit Gage, National Coordinator of the
National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom, 3321 12th St, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20017.
In late June/early July of 1999, the INS initiated six new secret evidence deportation/removal cases. All
the respondents in those cases are Muslims from Iran. The author was unable to obtain details about these
cases, or the identities of the respondents, by the time this article went to press. Also, a number of
individuals of Irish nationality were placed in deportation proceedings in 1998-99 with indications that
the INS would proceed on the basis of secret evidence against them. However, every one of these
proceedings has been placed in abeyance, and none of the individuals has been detained. Case documents
on file with Kit Gage, supra.
5. Recently, Muslims and Arabs appear to be the target of various types of investigation, surveillance,
harassment, and have been subject to criminalization of otherwise lawful associational activity by the FBI,
the INS, the DOJ and Congress. Apparently, FBI targeting of the Arab, and particularly Palestinian,
communities in the U.S. began in earnest around the time of the Gulf War. The FBI launched a nationwide
effort to question Arabs and Arab-Americans about terrorism around January 1991. FBI agents questioned
Arabs and Arab-Americans, whether U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or persons with temporary
status, at their homes, their places of work, and elsewhere. Across the country, FBI agents questioned
people about their political views, their opinions of Saddam Hussein, Israel, or U.S. policy in the Gulf. In
some cities, state or city police participated in the questioning. See Jim Doyle, FederalAgents Balancing
Rights, Terror Concerns,S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1991, atA7; Emily Sachar, FBI Grills NYArab-Americans,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1991, at 6; State Police, FBI QuestioningArabs, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 16,
1991; Lisa Belkin, ForMany Arab-Americans, FBI Scrutiny Renews Fears,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991, at
Al; FBI questions Arab-Americans in New Castle, Ohio, UPI, Jan. 10, 1991; Sharon LaFraniere, FBI
Starts InterviewingArab-American Leaders, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1991, atAt4. In one publicized incident,
David Najaab, a U.S. citizen of Arab origin in Texas, was visited by FBI agents who asked, among other
questions, concerning his knowledge of political activism in the Arab-American community and whether
he knew "anyone planning to blow up a federal building." Najaab was apparently questioned because he
was active in Arab-American political organizing. See JAMES DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE
CONSTITUION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECuRrrY 42-43 (1999) [hereinafter DEMPSEY & COLE]. Even after the Gulf War, observers reported that the FBI was continuing its

surveillance and questioning of members of the Palestinian and pro-Palestinian communities. See id. at 44.
In 1995, newspaper reporter Dan Freedman obtained a box of documents in response to a Freedom of
Information Act request he had filed six years earlier. The documents revealed that for a ten-year period
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indicates that the government is spending thousands of U.S. taxpayer dollars
on prosecuting and attempting to deport Arabs and Muslims under the rubric
of "terrorism," when the "classified evidence" used to charge them is
apparently nothing more than hearsay, innuendo, and, at most, guilt by
association. 6 Using secret evidence to deport Arabs and Muslims appears to
be the latest manifestation of a war waged by various government agencies
against these ethnic and religious groups; a war waged ostensibly to combat
"terrorism," but which raises the disturbing specter of ideological bias.
Ideological exclusion 7 reached its height in the McCarran-Walter Act" years.
Although that Act has been essentially repealed, its most troubling provisions
continue to be applied almost exclusively against aliens of Arab nationality
or origin.9

the FBI had investigated the activities of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), a student
organization supporting Palestinian self-determination. The investigation was conducted nationwide. The
objectives of the surveillance were unrelated to any suspected criminal activity. According to one FBI
report, the investigation's purpose was to: (1) identify new GUPS branches throughout the United States
and (2) identify the GUPS leaders and their whereabouts. See id. at 44 n.27. These documents are also on
file at National Archives in Washington, D.C. As part of its surveillance, FBI agents monitored GUPS
meetings, took hundreds of photographs of GUPS members, and interviewed individuals involved in
GUPS activities. See id. at 44-45.
6. Secret evidence is currently being used in a number of different venues against Arabs and Muslims.
However, the DOJ is also prosecuting individuals through grand jury proceedings, freezing their U.S.
assets and instituting civil forfeiture actions based on provisions in the 1996 Anti-Terrorist and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Executive Orders which impose penalties, both civil and criminal, on
persons who support a group the Secretary of State designates a "terrorist organization" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (Supp. I 1996). AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (1996), amending 8
U.S.C. § 2339B. For example, asset forfeiture was involved in the cases of Mohammad Salah and of
Nasher Ltd. v. Crestar Bank. Case documents on file with Kit Gage, supra note 4. The problematic
definition of "terrorist" and "terrorist organization" is addressed infra. This article focuses only on the
use of secret evidence in deportation or removal proceedings, and not in other contexts, although the
constitutional issues are similar in wherever secret evidence is used by the government against individuals
or groups in the United States.
7. Ideological exclusion, as it is used in this article, refers both to the deportation of persons for their
beliefs and associations, as well as to the exclusion or inadmission, of persons based on their political
orientation. The INA has distinct provisions regarding those who can be refused entry on ideological
grounds and those who can be deported on such grounds. The legal history of the grounds of ideological
exclusion from the McCarran-Walter provisions through the passage of IIRIRA is described infra.
8. Pub. L. No. 414-477, 66 Stat. 166-275 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-537).
9. After the Immigration Act of 1990, the exclusion grounds for ideology were significantly
narrowed; the amended language stated that "an alien.., shall not be excludable... because of the alien's
past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations
would be lawful within the United States ...[unless] 'the Secretary of State personally determines that the
alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.' "IMMACT 90,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5071 (1990), amending INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
However, the amended provisions continue to permit the government to exclude aliens who "seek[] to
enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in: (i) any activity to violate any law of
the United States relating to espionage or sabotage ...(ii) any other unlawful activity; or (iii) any activity
a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United
States by force, violence, or other unlawful means." INA § 212(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(iii) (1999). AEDPA further amended the exclusion grounds to permit the exclusion of any alien who "is a
representative of a foreign organization ...or is a member of a foreign terrorist organization..." INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 411, 110 Stat. 1214, 1268 (1996). The INA specifies only one organization as engaging in terrorist
activity: the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter PLO). INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (1999). Under AEDPA, a very broad definition is offered for designating an organization
as terrorist: "if the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or
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This, the most recent in a long history of attempts by the U.S. government
and its agencies to exclude or deport aliens solely on the basis of their beliefs
or associations, is, unfortunately, the most likely to succeed. Arabs and
Muslims are vulnerable as immigrants or non-immigrants residing in the
United States because of the negative stereotyping equating them with
terrorists; they also have negligible political muscle and have been the
specific target of much legislative and executive activity directed to silence,
exclude, deport and restrict them.' °
This article focuses on the government's use of secret evidence in the
deportation, exclusion and removal cases currently pending against the more
than two dozen Arab and Muslim aliens mentioned above. It examines the
extent to which the government's strategies seem clearly designed to curb the
free speech, association and religious rights of these individuals residing in
the United States, a proposition that is supported by the histories of, and
tactics used, in the cases themselves. Aside from the fundamental question of
whether the use of classified evidence in deportation proceedings-or, for
that matter, in any proceedings in our court system-offends American
notions of fair play and substantial justice," these cases raise troubling

the national security of the United States." INA § 219(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(1)(C) (1999), amended
by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996).
Naturalization can also be denied to certain individuals, such as anarchists, members of the Communist
Party, and persons who advocate world communism or the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or
violence. See INA § 313(a)(1)-(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(1)-(6) (1999). These provisions also require that an
applicant for citizenship be "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States." INA
§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1999).
10. See Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Visa Denialson Ideological Grounds:An Update, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 260-61 (1985)
(discussing the McCarran-Walter Act, particularly 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(6), and recent amendments);
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 96-60, § 901, 93 Stat. 397
(1979) (prohibiting exclusion or deportation of any aliens, except for PLO members, officers, or
representatives, for statements or beliefs which would be protected if engaged in by U.S. citizens); see
also Susan M. Akram, Historic Court Decision ProtectsFirst Amendment Rights of DissidentAliens, 18
IMMIGR. NEWSL. (National Immigr. Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Boston, Mass.), Spring 1989, at 7
(discussing the closure of the Palestine Information Office (PIO) as well as the PLO Observer Mission
ordered by the proposed Grassley Amendment); Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (challenging the Grassley Amendment which required closure of the PIO in Washington, D.C.);
United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (challenging another provision of the Grassley
Amendment which required closure of the PLO Observer Mission at the U.N.); Terrorist Group Hamas
Banning Act of 1993, S.503, 103d Cong.; Terrorist Interdiction Act of 1993, H.R. 2041, 103d Cong.; 8
U.S.C. 1182 § (a)(3)(b)(i)(V). The most recent terrorist list appears at Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (1999) and includes Abu Hafs al-Masri, Abu Nidal Organization
(ANO), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hizballah, Islamic Army (a.k.a.
Al-Qaida, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, The
World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the Holy
Sites), Islamic Gama'at (IG), Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (PU), Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction (PLF-Abu
Abbas), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa, and Usama bin Muhammad bin
Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin) as terrorists who threaten to disrupt the middle east peace
process.
11. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological
Regulation in the ImmigrationLaws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
833 (1997); Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
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questions of constitutional and procedural irregularities 12 that appear to be
immune to serious challenge or judicial review. Furthermore, the article
reviews the government's strategies in the "secret evidence" cases; raises
the question whether these strategies are designed to chill the free speech
and association rights of Arabs and Muslims in particular in this country; and
suggests that, for a number of reasons, the government's tactics are likely
to succeed in these cases despite the resounding defeat given similar
ideological exclusion efforts in the past. Review of the cases themselves
requires a hard look at the motivations behind the strange congruence of
factors allowing the INS virtually free reign to trample the rights of a clearly
targeted group of individuals with either the encouragement, or at least
complicity, of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
Part II reviews the historical and political background of ideological
exclusion in the United States. Part III provides background information
regarding the use of secret evidence in ideological exclusion cases. Part IV
examines the government's tactics and strategies in six of the two dozen
secret evidence cases currently being litigated, the spurious nature of the
government's "classified evidence" emerging from the cases, and evidence
in the cases of institutionalized bias against Arabs and Muslims. Part V
examines the factors in the legislative and judicial branches which allow
Arabs and Muslims to be targeted for their unpopular beliefs and associations, and ensure limited checks and balances on the INS' ability to carry out
this strategy. Part VI concludes by pointing out some of the possible sources
of this institutionalized bias, and the dangerous consequences it has on the
civil liberties of Arabs and Muslims in the United States.
II.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION

In the words of Peter Pan, "all this has gone before, and will go again."
Ideologically motivated exclusion of aliens is nothing new. The exclusion of
the politically unpalatable from these shores goes back to the Alien and
Sedition Acts of the 1790s,1 3 which prohibited the entry of anarchists,
communists and others with undesirable thoughts and associations. From the
Palmer Raids to the victims of McCarthy, immigration history is replete with

Proceedings,7 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of
Aliens: Lessons From the Lives of Ellen Knauff andIgnatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
12. There are three main constitutional concerns raised by the government's tactics in these cases: (1)
serious due process concerns in all cases in which secret evidence is the basis for deportation or exclusion
of aliens, (2) First Amendment concerns about the implications of deporting or detaining aliens on the
basis of guilt by association, and (3) serious equal protection concerns about a pattern in which Arabs and
Muslims are singled out for deportation. Each of these independent constitutional concerns is raised in this
article. The author thanks David Cole for raising these points.
13. Alien and Sedition Act, c. 66, S 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798)
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the sad and sordid tales of the removal of aliens14whose speech the politically
powerful of the time simply could not tolerate.
A.

The Excesses of IdeologicalExclusion Under the McCarran-WalterAct

The McCarran-Walter Act of 195215 was motivated by Congress' desire to
deny entry into the United States to aliens who espoused communist6
sentiments. Despite President Truman's vociferous opposition to the bill,'
the McCarran-Walter Act was passed. The most offensive sections to civil
libertarians were embodied in subsections (a)(27)-(29), which permitted
exclusion and deportation on the basis of ideology: communists, anarchists,
members of socialist labor and "subversive organizations" were the targets
of the law.' 7 The war on communism of the 1940s and 1950s instigated the most
famous cases of ideological exclusion and deportation.18 According to a 1984
internal report of the INS, over 8000 aliens from ninety-eight countries were
14. The "Palmer Raids" were named after Attorney General Mitchell Palmer who, in the foment of
World War I, rounded up for deportation dozens of non-citizens who were active in either the domestic
labor movement, or were part of the Industrial Workers of the World. For an excellent exposition of the
ignominious history of ideological exclusion, see Johnson, supra note 11, at 833.
15. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (1952)).
16. President Truman stated, in his veto of McCarran-Walter: "Some of these provisions would
empower the Attorney General to deport any alien who has engaged or has had a purpose to engage in
activities 'prejudicial to the public interest' or 'subversive to the national security.' No standards or
definitions are provided to guide discretion in the exercise of powers so sweeping. To punish undefined
activities departs from traditional American insistence on established standards of guilt. To punish an
undefined purpose is thought control." President's Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 1952-53 PuB. PAPERS 441,445 (June 25, 1952).
17. The relevant sections of the INA provided that the following aliens were ineligible for visas: (1)
any alien that a consular officer or the Attorney General believed would be prejudicial to the public interest
or security of the United States; (2) any alien that is, or was affiliated in the last five years with any
organization that advocates anarchy, or the overthrow of the United States government; or (3) aliens that
advocate, or aliens affiliated with groups that advocate World Communism or totalitarian dictatorship. See
INA § 212(a)(27)-(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)-(29) (1952), as amended by IMMACT 90, § 601(a).
18. See generally Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (holding that under § 244(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, the Attorney General could rightly deny an alien's suspension of deportation
on the basis of confidential information never disclosed to him, even where the alien met the prerequisites
for granting relief); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (holding that Congress, under its broad power
over deportation of aliens, did not have to demonstrate that an alien, who was a member of the Communist
Party, supported or even had knowledge of the party's advocacy of violence against the United States
government in order to deport the alien under the Internal Security Act of 1950); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that the continued exclusion of an alien determined to
be a security risk did not violate his statutory or constitutional rights, even when such exclusion resulted in
his continued detention at Ellis Island because of the refusal of other countries to admit him); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that expulsion of aliens who are members of the Communist
Party violates neither due process or the right to free speech, nor does it constitute an ex post facto law);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S 524 (1952) (holding that the Communist Party's advocacy of the use of force
against the United States government is sufficient to authorize Congress to expel known alien Communists
under its power to regulate the admission and expulsion of aliens); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950) (holding that special wartime security restrictions on the entry of aliens under the War Brides Act
should not cease to apply upon the cessation of hostilities and that the power to exclude an alien under this
Act stems not only from legislative power but is also inherent in the executive power); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945) and United States v. Bridges, 87 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1949), Bridges v. United
States, 199 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd and remanded, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). But see United States v.
Bridges, 133 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that the government failed to prove the allegations of
respondent's membership in the Communist Party by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, the
respondent's citizenship not revoked).
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excluded from the United States for their political beliefs or associations
under McCarran-Walter between 1952 and 1984.19
For twenty-five years, the McCarran-Walter Act's ideological exclusion
provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court and untouched by Congress.
One of the best-known cases illustrating the Supreme Court's position
towards ideological exclusion under McCarran-Walter was Kleindienst v.
Mandel.20 Ernst Mandel, a well-known Belgian journalist and socialist, was
invited to speak at a number of universities in the United States. The consular
office denied his visitor's visa on the basis of his socialist beliefs under
section 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 2 I and
the groups which invited Mandel to speak challenged the denial. The
Supreme Court upheld the visa denial on the basis that Congress' plenary
power in the area of immigration meant the courts could not intervene. The
decision to grant or deny a visa was tested by whether the government had a
22
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for its decision.
A battle against the McCarran-Walter Act was waged in the lower courts
and in the press.2 3 A number of famous individuals were denied visas to the
United States, and the denials made headlines.24 When Hortensia Allende,
the widow of assassinated Chilean President Salvador Allende, was denied a
visa to visit the United States for speaking engagements, she, along with her
U.S. citizen hosts, sued the Attorney General.25 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the visa denial, holding that the government had not
provided a legitimate basis for excluding her.26 The court also held that the
ideological exclusion grounds could only prohibit unlawful activity, not
beliefs.2 7
19.

See David Cole, The 1952 McCarran-WalterAct: Is it Irrelevant in Today's World? NAT'L. L.J.,

May 29, 1989, at 22; see also Dave Martella, Defending the Land ofthe Free andthe Home of the Fearful:
The Use of ClassifiedInformation to Deport Suspected Terrorists, 7 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 951, 962

(1992).
20.
21.
22.
23.

408 U.S. 753 (1972).
See id. at 769.
See id.
See Keisha A. Gary, CongressionalProposalsto Revive Guilt by Association:An Ineffective Plan

to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 238 (1994); see also Court Says U.S. Erred in Visa Denial:
Widow of Allende Was to Give Speeches, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1988, at AI5; A Bit more Freedom, L.A.

TIMES, Dec. 22, 1987, at 6; Sydney Blumenthal, Congress Lifts Political-Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under
McCarran-WalterAct, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1987, at A 11; A Free Country, Sort of TORONTO STAR, Oct.

12, 1987, at At2; Nicholas Goldberg, PoliticsStill Groundsfor Deportation,NEWSDAY (New York), May
8, 1987, at 15; Steny H. Hoyer, It's lime to Repeal McCarran-Walter-AMockery of Our Freedoms, STAR
TRMB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 9, 1987, atAl5; Stephen Franklin, Arab-Americans Feel Sting of U.S.
Crackdown on Terrorism, CHI. TRm., June 21, 1987, at 8; Judith Bender, Crackdown on DissidentAliens
Palestinians'CaseStirs Legal Debate Over Immigrants'Rights,NEWSDAY, May 25, 1987, at 4; Ronald S.

Soble & Victor Hull, Lawsuit ChallengesMcCarranAct, Deportationof 8 Alleged Marxists, L.A. TIMEs,
Apr. 4, 1987, at 27.
24.

See Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain:America's National Borderand the

Free Flow ofIdeas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 723 (1985) ("[T]he list of those excluded... reads like
an intellectual and cultural honor role, including Pablo Neruda, Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel Garcia Marquez,
Regis Debray, Ernst Mandel, Dario Fo, and even Pierre Trudeau.").
25. See Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
26. See id.
27. Seeid. at 1116.
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Adverse publicity associated with Allende and other cases drew sustained
public attention and criticism of ideology as a basis for denying entry to
certain aliens. Most important, the courts played a central role in checking
the government's use of these exclusion grounds to chill speech and association rights. As in the earlier era of McCarran-Walter and the Ellen Knauff and
Ignatz Mezei cases, when Congress forced the Attorney General to hold
public hearings in which the unsustainable hearsay evidence which the
government claimed was "classified" came to light, the courts were the
guardians against executive and congressional extremism. The Allende, as
well as the later LA 828 and Rafeedie29 decisions, were strong motivators for
Congress to begin efforts to repeal McCarran-Walter. However, the repeal of
McCarran-Walter faced a formidable barrier called the doctrine of plenary
power.

B.

The Doctrine of Plenary Power and its Role in IdeologicalExclusion

The doctrine of "plenary power" can be seen as the hole in the Constitution through which immigrants and aliens fall. An oft-repeated characterization of plenary power is attributed to Nishimura Ekiu: "Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned." 30 There are two discrete aspects to the judiciallycreated doctrine of plenary power: (1) that the Constitution does not constrain Congress or the Executive in matters concerning immigration; and (2)
that the courts will not review congressional or executive action in the
immigration area. Although some argue that the force of this doctrine has
waned with the rise of heightened due process analyses adopted by a number
of federal courts in the immigration context, others argue that it is stronger
than ever.3

28. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC) v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
1995).
29. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992).
30. Nishimura Eiku v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892), cited in Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
31. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255 (1985) (contending that the courts should abandon the special deference given to Congress in the field of immigration); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASNGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) (summarizing the recent treatment by the judiciary of plenary power doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogatesfor Substantive Constitutional Rights,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (asserting that the plenary power doctrine has eroded significantly in the last decades as a result of the evolution of procedural due process as an exception
to the plenary power doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990)
(arguing that the gradual demise of the plenary power doctrine is the result of liberal statutory interpretation); Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984)
(predicting the gradual demise of doctrine and the expansion of judicial review in immigration
law).
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Most courts and commentators credit the 1889 Supreme Court decision in
Chae Chan Ping (the Chinese Exclusion Case)32 as the source of the plenary
power doctrine. 33 Although there has been significant judicial dissent 34 to
various manifestations of the plenary power doctrine, it persists in constraining judicial review over immigration decisions in both the exclusion and
deportation context. Plenary power has been used to permit exclusion and
deportation for ideological reasons since the 1904 decision of Turner v.
United States. 35 The McCarran-Walter Act ideological exclusion grounds
were frequently upheld on the basis that they were a 'valid' exercise of
plenary power.36
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the lower courts began chipping away at
the application of plenary power in ideological exclusion and deportation
cases. Such cases as Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 37 Abourezk v.
Reagan,3 8 and Allende v. Shultz39 presaged greater judicial review and

constraint of the Executive Branch and Congress-at least where first
amendment rights were concerned.4n
Two cases in particular seemed to indicate that, until recently, the Supreme
Court was also beginning to disfavor the use of plenary power as a restraint
4t
on judicial review of immigration determinations: Kleindienst v. Mandel
and INS v. Chadha.42 The first case indicates-despite its holding against the

32. 130 U.S. 581 (1889), affg In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888) [hereinafter
Chinese Exclusion Case].
33. The Chinese Exclusion Case is weak precedent for the later expressions of plenary power which
cite it. It really concerned the relationship between the federal government and the states vis-A-vis the
power to exclude or deport in the context of foreign treaties. See id. The Supreme Court held that federal
immigration power as an aspect of sovereignty supersedes state authority to control immigration, and that
treaties with foreign states cannot constrain that power. See id. The Chinese Exclusion Case does not
suggest that as to the relationship between and among the three branches of government, the congressional
authority over immigration is plenary.
34. See Philip Monrad, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. REv. 831
(1989).
35. 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (allowing INS to deport a resident alien who was a self-proclaimed
"anarchist" because he called for a general strike to protest labor conditions). The Court stated Congress
had power to exclude "political philosophers innocent of evil intent." Id. at 294.
36. See e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); see also STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW
AND POLITCS IN BRrrAIN AND AMERICA 199-204 (1987).

37. 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986) (enjoining Secretary of State from denying right of PLO
representative to the UN Zehdi Labib Terzi to travel to Harvard to participate in debate about Middle East
policies), vacated without opinion, 852 F.2d 563 (1 st Cir. 1986).
38. 785 F.2d 1043 (1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (vacating and
remanding for reconsideration visa denials to Nino Pasti, former Italian Senator, NATO General and peace
activist with World Peace Council and to Thomas Borge, Interior Minister of Nicaragua).
39. 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985) (overturning visa denials to Hortensia Allende); see also supra
text accompanying notes 23-27.
40. Philip Monrad argues that plenary power has either been invalidated in the realm of ideological
exclusion, or that there is a first amendment exception to the doctrine. See Monrad, supranote 34.
41. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). The type of review over agency decisions and the force of constitutional
rights is much more deferential to the agency when the alien is seeking entry ab initio. This was a critical
factor in the Court's decision of the scope of its review in Kleindienst.
42. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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alien and in favor of the government-that the Supreme Court would review
and independently judge the validity of the Executive's decisions concerning
rights of aliens where freedom of speech and association are implicated even
in cases of excludable aliens. It is important to note that the Court also
applied a heightened review because the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens
were involved; however, the Court was reluctant to give much protection on
this ground, because any exclusion decision could be challenged by persons
within the United Sates wanting to meet with an excludable alien. 43 Kleindienst v. Mandel is often cited to support the application of plenary power,
but the analyses and findings suggest otherwise. 44 In Mandel, the government suggested that the standard for review of its decisions concerning the
grant or denial of visas should be complete deference, that it had "sole and
unfettered discretion" over such decisions, and that it neither had to have a
reason nor was it required to give a reason for its decisions.45 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating instead that the government must have46a
"facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for denying visa applications.
However, the Court found that the government's reason for denial-that
Mandel had previously violated his visa conditions-met this test. In finding
that the government's reason was justified, and that it was unrelated to free
expression, the Court specifically left open "[w]hat First Amendment or
other grounds may be available for attacking exercise
of discretion for which
47
no justification whatever has been advanced.",
The second case represents real progress in the Court's whittling down of
plenary power. INS v. Chadha, a separation of powers case,48 was the first
case in which the Court invalidated immigration legislation on the grounds
that it was unconstitutional. 4 9 The Government vigorously argued that the
court had no review power over immigration legislation, but the Supreme

43. The author thanks David Cole for a reminder of this point.
44. Philip Monrad argues that Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) is another case in which the
Supreme Court indicates it will not apply plenary power carte blanche. See Monrad, supra note 34.
However, in Fiallo, the Court upheld a statutory classification which was clearly unconstitutional if
applied to a U.S. citizen, without applying a less deferential standard than suggested in the most
extravagant versions of plenary power. See 430 U.S. 787. Monrad's argument rests on two footnotes, 5 and
6, in which Justice Powell states: "Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under
the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of
aliens..." id. at 793 n.5, and: "This is not to say, as we make clear in n.5, supra, that the Government's
power in this area is never subject to judicial review." Id. at 795 n.6. The point is, despite the footnote
language, in contrast to applying a facially legitimate and bona fide standard as in Mandel, the Court
applied an extreme deference standard in Fiallo.
45. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769.
46. Id. at 770.
47. Id.
48. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-54 (holding that legislation which gave one house of Congress a
"legislative veto" over decisions to suspend deportation of an alien without the vote of the other house

violated the U.S. Constitution art. I §§ I and 7 and art. I § 7, cl.
3).
49. Scholars of the subject distinguish the type of scrutiny the Court will give to immigration
decisions when the issue is one of substantive as opposed to procedural due process. Immigration
determinations involving substantive due process, and implicating questions of equal protection, are
granted the greatest deference-arguably, the full force of plenary power comes into play. See, e.g.,
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Court responded, "The plenary authority of Congress over aliens ....is not
open to question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen
a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power." 50 Until
recently, the history of the Court's view of plenary power in ideological
exclusion cases was steadily becoming more positive. Bridges v. Wixon,554l
53
Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy,5 2 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, and Mathews v. Diaz
all strongly suggest that when First Amendment freedoms are implicated in
the decisions to deport or exclude, a higher standard of scrutiny will apply
than is suggested by "plenary power deference." This line of cases is critical
because it reflects a willingness-now apparently abandoned with the recent
decision of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
("AADC") 5 5 -of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to apply a
different standard to immigration determinations that implicate First Amendment rights and to intervene to scrutinize such determinations under the
prevailing First Amendment analysis applied to decisions in a nonimmigration setting.56
The lower courts' more recent decisions under the McCarran-Walter Act
emphasize this premise. The District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions in the
LA 8 case stood for the proposition that exclusion or deportation decisions
which chill or suppress speech or association must be tested under the
searching standard of Brandenburgv. Ohio.57 Judge Wilson's decision in the
LA 8 case striking down the McCarran-Walter provisions as unconstitutional
and overbroad, helped bring about the legislative repeal of those provisions
in the 1990 amendments of the INA. These decisions reflected a judicial
disposition to closely scrutinize decisions that implied exclusion or deportation on grounds of ideology. In fact, it can fairly be said that until the 1996

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (stating that plenary power doctrine also applies
to substantive due process and upholding deportation because of prior communist party membership).
On the other hand, decisions in which procedural due process is implicated are afforded the same
procedural due process analysis required in other contexts. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) (establishing a tri-partite test to determine the constitutional sufficiency of INS
procedures).
50. Chadha,462 U.S. at 940-41.
51. 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,concurring) ("Since resident aliens have constitutional
rights, it follows that Congress may not ignore them in the exercise of its 'plenary' power of

deportation.").
52. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
53. 355 U.S. 115 (1957) (striking down Communist affiliation as a basis for deporting resident aliens,
and applying a higher scrutiny to such decisions because of their impingement on rights of association).
54. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
55. 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999)
56. Harisiades,Bridges, and Rowoldt were decided under the prevailing First Amendment standard of
Dennis v. United States, which permitted restrictions on speech that reflected "methodological but prudent
incitement to violence." 341 U.S. 494 (1951). By the time the District Court in California heard the First
Amendment challenges to the McCarran-Walter Act in the LA 8 litigation, the standard became the
Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1960) test, under which speech could not be suppressed unless it
was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and .. . likely to incite or produce such
action."
57. 395 U.S. 444.
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legislation, the courts had found exclusion and deportation on ideological
grounds to be unconstitutional.
III.

A.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE USE OF SECRET
EVIDENCE IN IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION CASES

Secret Evidence as an EssentialStrategy in IdeologicalExclusion
Cases

The war on communism was the backdrop for a series of cases on which
the INS continues to rely as precedent for its far-reaching interpretations of
the authority to use classified evidence in current deportation,5 8exclusion and
59
removal cases. The most infamous of those cases are Knauff and Mezei.
Knauff and Mezei were the first cases in which the INS sought to deport or

exclude aliens on the basis of undisclosed evidence. Both cases were brought
in the post-World War II period, when anti-Communist sentiment was at a
peak in the United States. 60 Ellen Knauff, a German national, married a
United States citizen in Germany. She applied to naturalize through her
marriage under the War Brides Act. 6 ' When Ellen Knauff arrived at Ellis
Island, she was detained and ordered excluded without the benefit of a
hearing.6 2 The order was upheld by both the district court and the court of
appeals. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court found the Regulations,
including the use of confidential information, constitutional: "Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned. '' 6 3 The dissents of Justices Jackson, Frankfurter,
and Black concerning the use of confidential evidence in the case, however,
were caustic. Justice Jackson stated that "[t]he plea that evidence of guilt
must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the
malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the
role of informer undetected and uncorrected." 64
Justice Jackson's concerns were borne out in Ellen Knauff's case. Following the Supreme Court decision, Congress itself took action on Knauff's
behalf, introducing private bills and convening hearings on Knauff's case.
Knauff remained in detention in Ellis Island for two and a half years before
58. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
59. Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
60. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 allowed for deportation of aliens convicted of crimes under
the Act, including distributing literature advocating overthrow of the government or knowingly belonging
to a group advocating this aim. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 23(b), 54 Stat. 673 (1940)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385-87).
61. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539 (citing the War Brides Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591; Alien
Registration Act of 1949; Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252 (1942)).
62. The Attorney General cited "security reasons," see id. at 544, for denying Knauff entry under
regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1945 Supp.), passed pursuant to the Act of June 21, 1941, which
permitted the President to restrict immigration during time of war or national emergency. The regulations
permitted exclusion based on confidential information and without a hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b).
63. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892)).
64. Id. at551.
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the Attorney General, under congressional pressure and in the face of
substantial adverse publicity, ordered the INS to reopen proceedings and give
her the benefit of a full exclusion hearing. At the hearing, the government's
so-called confidential information was finally revealed. 6 5 The evidence
produced by the government was, in the words of the Board of Immigration
Appeals "uncorroborated hearsay ... [which] does not amount to substantial
evidence to support an exclusion decision." ' 66 The main evidence against
by a former scorned lover of her American
Ellen Knauff was provided
67
husband, Kurt Knauff.
Ignatz Mezei's case was similar, although his situation was more compelling because he did not have another country to return to if the United States
denied him entry. Mezei's nationality was uncertain. 68 He was born in
Gibraltar of either Hungarian or Rumanian parents, came to the United States
in 1923, married a U.S. citizen and remained in the United States until May
1948 .69 He departed the United States to visit his dying mother in Romania,
but was refused permission to enter Romania. 7 ° When he tried to return to the
United States, he was detained and charged on the grounds that his entry
would be "prejudicial to the public interest," and excluded without a hearing
based on the government's confidential information. 7 ' Both Mezei and the
INS sought to obtain permission for him to resettle in a third country, but
those efforts were unsuccessful. 72 Mezei remained in INS detention in Ellis
Island for twenty-one months.73

Five habeas corpus petitions later, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York ruled that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
"applies even to aliens on Ellis Island," and that unless Mezei's release was
clearly shown to endanger public safety, he should be released on bond.7 4
The government, steadfastly refusing to disclose its confidential information,
took the case to the Supreme Court, which cited the plenary power doctrine
of Nishimura Ekiu and Chae Chan Ping that the power to exclude aliens is a
"fundamental sovereign attribute ... largely immune from judicial con-

65. The Government produced three witnesses against Knauff, whose testimony essentially amounted
to hearsay and uncorroborated conclusions that Knauff was involved in passing secrets to Czechoslovak
authorities. The Special Inquiry Officer ruled against Knauff, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
reversed, finding that there was no substantial evidence that Knauff gave secret information to the Czech
authorities, nor that she would engage in subversive activities if admitted to the United States. See
Weisselberg, supranote 11, at 962-63 (citing In re Ellen Raphael Knauff, No. A-6937471, 8-10 (BIA Aug.
29, 1951)).
66. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 963-64 (citing In re Ellen Raphael Knauff, at 8-10).
67.

See In re Ellen Raphael Knauff.

68. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 208-09.
73. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 966.
74. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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Once again, public pressure forced Congress to act on Mezei's
behalf. Private bills were introduced,7 6 and the Attorney General ordered that
Mezei should have an exclusion hearing before a Special Inquiry Board.77 At
the hearing, the Board found that the government's evidence did not prove
that Mezei had been an active member of the Communist Party after 1934.
Moreover, when he was an active member, he was an insignificant partici-pant.78 The Board recommended that Mezei be granted parole.79 Until he had
an exclusion hearing and the government's evidence was produced on the
record, Mezei was unable to prove that he was not a national security threat.8 °
The significance of these cases lies in the fact that, even at the height of the
Cold War, there was enormous public and Congressional concern about the
use of confidential information to justify deporting or excluding an alien. 81
These two cases also highlight the extreme dangers of the use of classified
evidence in deportation or removal proceedings. Without the benefit of
having evidence against the alien produced in open court, on the record, the
mere mention of "national security" or "terrorism" can be enough to deprive
the individual of substantial rights even if the labels are nothing more than a
cloak for the "meddlesome, the misinformed, the malevolent and the
corrupt."

82

B. The Unconstitutionalityof IdeologicalExclusion, and the Dubious
Constitutionalityof Secret Evidence
The classic distinction in constitutional protections in the immigration
context is between deportable and excludable-now inadmissible-aliens.
The INS frequently argues that the latter class of aliens are considered not to
have a liberty interest to be admitted to the United States under the
Constitution, to be released from detention, or to be afforded the same
constitutional protections as lawful resident aliens in the deportation or
removal context. The only protections under the classic doctrine available for
excludable/inadmissible aliens are whatever Congress authorizes by stat75. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Knauff, 338 U.S. 537; and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952)).
76. See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 971 (citing S. 1414, 83d Cong. (1953) and H.R. 4858, 83d
Cong. (1953)).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 983 (citing Reporter's Transcript of Exclusion Proceedings Against Ignatz Mezei at 849,
File No. A-2 024 778 (N.Y. 0300-307995)).
79. See id.
80. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("This man, who seems to have lead a life of
unrelieved insignificance, must have been astonished to find himself suddenly putting the Government of
the United States in such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him.").
81. Knauff's case arose under the War Brides Act, which excepted from naturalization those aliens
whose entry "would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States." War Brides Act of Dec. 28, 1945,
Ch. 591. The President's emergency war powers authorized the regulations permitting the use of the
confidential evidence in exclusion proceedings. See id. When Knauffs case was litigated, these war
powers were still in effect. Mezei's case reflected the hysteria concerning Communist Party affiliation.
82. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 551 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ute. 83 But the classic doctrine of the distinction in protections for excludable/
inadmissible versus deportable/removable aliens has been diminished under
various theories applying, in particular, the First and Fifth Amendments.
Many commentators have argued that the entry doctrine, or lack of constitutional protections in exclusion doctrine, has now been substantially eroded. 84
A number of federal courts, including in a number of instances the U.S.
Supreme Court, have agreed. 85
In most of the current "secret evidence" cases, the INS has implied that
the substance of the secret evidence relates to the aliens' associations with
groups the INS states are "terrorist," or to speech or silence which, the INS
contends, proves that they condone "terrorist activity." However, association
with individuals and organizations, even terrorist organizations, is protected
by the First Amendment except where there is evidence demonstrating that
the individual meets a specific intent standard to further the group's illegal
ends.86 The Supreme Court developed the standard forbidding governmental
scrutiny or interference in speech and associational activity in a long line of
cases beginning in the 1950s. 8 7

83. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 ("It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to ... due process of law. But an alien on the
threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing; whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process as far as the alien denied entry is concerned." (citations omitted)).
84. See supranotes 31, 65.
85. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977) ("Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial
responsibility under the Constitution, even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission
); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. at 713 ("The paramount law of
and exclusion of aliens ....
the Constitution" limits Congressional and Executive power to exclude aliens.). Since the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution applies to "persons," not to "citizens," excludable aliens are protected by
the Constitution in certain circumstances. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Case law has extended
these circumstances. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 918 (1993) (conditions of
detention); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (criminal issues); Xiao v. Reno, 837 F.
Supp. 1506, 1548-50) (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom. Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996)
(prosecutorial and INS misconduct); Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985) (governmental
actions independent of the immigration laws).
86. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 364 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (ruling against the government's
ability to punish an individual's association with a group, and holding that to do so, it must prove that the
individual had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of the group); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
186 (1972) (establishing a high burden on the government to show that there was knowing affiliation with
an organization pursuing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims which
posed the threat feared by the government). The "specific intent" standard is required to distinguish
between "guilt by association," which the First Amendment forbids, and individual culpability for
furthering illegal ends. Applying this distinction, the Supreme Court has struck down several statutes. See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1967) (striking down statute barring Communist
Party members from public and private employment); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
(striking down statute restricting the right to travel abroad); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. I
(197 1) (striking down statute restricting the right to engage in the practice of law); Communist Party of
Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,448-49 (1974) (striking down statute restricting right of access to the
ballot).
87. The Supreme Court overturned state efforts to restrict the activities of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
In Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), the Supreme Court held that recruiting members for a
group is protected associational activity. The Supreme Court has also held that raising money for a group
or making monetary contributions to a group is protected First Amendment activity. See Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). This includes money solicited for charitable purposes. See
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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The Supreme Court has been particularly concerned with protecting free
speech. In the seminal case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,88 the Supreme Court
held that "the Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
89
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.",
The Supreme Court has long recognized that aliens in the United States are
entitled to the protections of all those provisions of the Bill of Rights not
restricted to citizens. 90 The First Amendment in particular "acknowledges
[no] distinctions between citizens and resident aliens." 9 ' "[F]reedom of
speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country." 9 2 These
rights apply when the alien is present within our borders, whether he is here
lawfully or unlawfully.9 3 The District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions in
AADC v. Reno were the strongest recent cases recognizing that First Amendment freedoms require heightened procedural scrutiny whenever the Government seeks to deport or remove aliens on the basis of speech or associational
activities.9 4 The lower federal court decisions in this case were a major factor
in repealing the ideological exclusion provisions of the McCarran Walter Act
and stood for the proposition that aliens have the same First Amendment
protections as do citizens-until the Supreme Court dramatically under95
mined that proposition and the long case history behind it in Reno v. AADC.
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that in any non-immigration
context, the government's ability to punish freedom of association or speech
is severely limited. In the context of the use of secret evidence, to the extent
the government is denying these aliens the opportunity to confront the
evidence by which it seeks to demonstrate that they incited persecution of
others through conversations or association with members of disfavored or
terrorist groups, there is a serious danger that it is trying to sanction protected
associational activities. 96 Until the Supreme Court's Reno v. AADC decision,

88.

395 U.S. 444 (1969).

89.

Id. at 447 (restricting the right to exercise prior restraint or cast a chill over free speech). See also

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon PapersCase) (holding that the
New York Times could publish classified national security information because of the weighty presump-

tion against prior restraints). The decision ensures that once the press has obtained information of
importance to national security, it can usually publish such information. See also Henry Monaghan, First
Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970).

90.

See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953).

91. Id. at 596. See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Rafeedie v. INS 880 F.2d 506 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
92. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
93. See AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (according full First Amendment

protections to aliens alleged to have violated the terms of their visas and to be associated with a terrorist
group).
94. See generally AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d at 1062 (stating that First Amendment rights apply equally
to citizens and resident aliens). See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
95. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
96. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
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removing individuals on the basis of their speech and using secret evidence
concerning these associations would have been found unconstitutional as an
impermissible chill on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 97
Of course, constitutional theories have evolved to strengthen individual
rights in areas other than the First Amendment. Procedural and substantive
due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment are all areas in
which the courts have required heightened judicial scrutiny of executive and
congressional actions. The extent to which they have affected the use of
secret evidence in ideological exclusion cases is reviewed here.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been held to apply to
aliens, both in the deportation and exclusion context:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivations of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is
entitled to that constitutional protection. 98
Certain principles have become sacrosanct under the constitutional concept of due process. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, the evidence used to prove the government's case must
be disclosed so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. "No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it." 99 In a criminal trial, this principle is clearly articulated in the Sixth
Amendment and prohibits the government from relying on undisclosed
evidence to seek a conviction, even when the crime alleged is extremely
serious or the information is highly classified. °°
The risks of misuse of secret evidence are as high in the immigration
context where detention is involved as in the criminal context:
It is a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party access
to the evidence tendered in support of a requested court judgment. The

97. SeeRafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506,517 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d at 1062;
AADC v. Reno, 883 F Supp. 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
98. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that Congress may condition an alien's
eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program and this classification may not deprive
aliens of liberty or property without due process of law).
99. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
100. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). The use of classified evidence in criminal
proceedings is governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act, which allows the government to
substitute as evidence in the criminal trial an unclassified summary of the classified information. However,
the court may not accept the summary if it does not afford the defendant as full an opportunity to defend
himself as he would have if confronted with the entire classified information. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3
§ 6(c)(1) (1994).
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openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance
and reality of fairness in the adjudication of United States courts. It is
therefore the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the
merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.°t
As Justice Douglass stated in his dissent in Jay v. Boyd, a case on which the
INS continues to rely as authority for the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings, "A hearing is not a hearing in the American sense if
faceless informers or confidential information may be used to deprive a man
10 2
of his liberty."
Under Mathews v. Eldridge,0 3 the prevailing procedural due process case
to be applied to immigration decisions, the INS' use of classified evidence
presumptively violates the Fifth Amendment. Under Mathews, due process
considerations require examining three factors in deciding whether due
process has been satisfied: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the
official action;' °4 (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or
substitute safeguards; 10 5 and (3) the government's interest, including the
burdens that additional or substitute procedures would entail. 106

101. Abourezkv. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043,1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afftd, Reagan v.Abourezk, 484 U.S.
1 (1987); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant summary
judgment on the basis of materials submitted in camera because "[o]ur system of justice does not
encompass ex parte determinations on the merits in cases in civil litigation").
102. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 376 (1956). In Jay, the Attorney General was permitted to order the
deportation of a 65-year old noncitizen who had resided in the United States for over 40 years on the basis
of undisclosed evidence. See id. However, the INS dropped its efforts to deport Jay under strong
congressional pressure. John Coughlin, Statement by Jay's Attorney at National Immigration Project
Conference on Secret Evidence (November, 1998).
103. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
104. Under the first prong of Mathews, an assessment of the alien's interests must include the
deprivation of liberty and possible loss of life that is involved in the secret evidence cases. See id. at 321.
Those considerations are heightened in the cases in which the respondents are claiming political asylum. It
is clear that no other liberty interest is stronger than that of a person facing the possibility of removal to a
country where he will be imprisoned, tortured, and even killed as the result of beliefs or status protected
under the Refugee Convention.
105. Under the second prong of Mathews, the court must address the risks of erroneously depriving
the alien of a substantial right or benefit. See id. In the current cases, the risk of error in a proceeding based
on secret evidence is extremely high. Even if secret evidence is reviewed on appeal, the risk of error
remains high because subsequent courts will have no way to determine whether the applicant could have
rebutted the secret evidence or, indeed, whether the secret evidence is a complete fabrication. In a number
of the secret evidence cases, the INS has used unreliable evidence to support detention or removal,
including mistranslated documents, allegations without basis reflecting anti-Muslim bias, and biased and
unqualified "experts." See infra notes 182-225, 315-38 and accompanying text. Moreover, whether there
would even be a complete record of the contents of the evidence which could properly be reviewed by the
appellate courts is an open question. Without any check on the accuracy of the form in which INS presents
the information, on the accuracy of translations of information offered by the INS, or any guarantees of the
veracity or bias of the agent offering the evidence, the profferor can present any conclusions he wants, out
of context, and unchallenged. The requirement of full disclosure of evidence helps ensure the fairness of
the proceedings.
106. Under the third prong of Mathews, it is important to identify precisely the risk the government
faces if the use of secret evidence is prohibited. See 424 U.S. at 321. Clearly, if the evidence contains
statements which the alien himself has spoken or heard, the government can have little interest in keeping
its contents classified. If the government is not permitted to introduce secret evidence, it may choose to
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Recent federal decisions specifically held that the use of secret evidence in
immigration proceedings violates due process. In Rafeedie v. INS, the INS
asserted national security concerns and sought to rely on secret evidence to
exclude Rafeedie. 10 7 The District Court held that the INS' attempt to rely on
secret evidence violated due process. 10 8 Recently, in its AADC v. Reno
decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the INS could not
constitutionally rely on undisclosed information to deny legalization to aliens
accused of association with terrorist organizations, and that the government's
asserted national security concerns were insufficient reason to rely on
confidential information.' 09
The government's assertion that the immigration judges ("IJs") may not
disregard proffered secret evidence highlights the danger the government's
position poses to essential notions of due process and fairness. By merely
invoking the word "terrorist," the government would be allowed to introduce
evidence which otherwise would fail scrutiny for basic rules of admissibility.
Under the government's approach, there is no check against such abuse. " 0 If
the government's position prevails, it becomes the arbiter of the credibility

keep that information confidential and simply not use the evidence in the exclusion proceedings. In none
of the cases being litigated at the time this article was completed has the government actually charged the
aliens with excludability or removability on the basis of any criminal or national security grounds, nor has
it charged that the aliens' entry or proposed activities in the United States would have potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. There is no indication that the government's
interests in excluding these aliens, therefore, is a matter of national security.
107. See Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part,and remanded,
880 F2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
108. See Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). The Circuit Court found the INS' use of
secret evidence repugnant, even though it was in exclusion proceedings, and ordered the INS to pay
substantial attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See Rafeedie v. INS (D.D.C. Aug. 22,
1996) (mem.). Every judge to review the INS' actions in Rafeedie found the government's position
regarding secret evidence "profoundly troubling." Rafeedie, 880 F 2d at 525 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
The use of secret evidence "afford[s] virtually none of the procedural protections designed to minimize
the risk that the government may err." Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 19. The circuit court noted that Rafeedie
could prevail "only if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence against him" and concluded that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden." Rafeedie,
880 F.2d at 516.
109. See AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court noted that "use of undisclosed
information in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional" and that "[o]nly the most
extraordinary circumstances could support a one-sided process." Id. at 1070.
110. As an example, in Anwar Haddam's case, see infra notes 172-90 and accompanying text,
the INS indicated that the evidence it sought to present ex parte, in camera, consisted of Haddam's
own wiretapped telephone conversations. To the extent it is possible to discern that the secret evidence comprises the alien's own statements or results of surveillance of his home, telephone conversations, or activities, the evidence may be exculpatory, and the Constitution requires production
of that evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution). The D.C. Circuit has held that a criminal defendant, facing possible "loss of freedom or life" demonstrated an "exceptional and urgent need to obtain any and all information
that could prove exculpatory." Summers v. United States Dept. of Justice, 925 F.2d 450, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (citing Cleaver v. Kelley, 427 F. Supp. 80, 81 (D.D.C. 1976)). In the cases in which the alien is
being held in custody, the INS has the authority to detain them indefinitely. The loss of liberty is so
compelling that the alien should have the same absolute right to exculpatory evidence as a criminal
defendant.
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and materiality of such evidence. The prosecutor becomes the adjudicator, a
result that is anathema to the fundamental principles of our society.
Despite the strong constitutional prohibitions against the government's
tactics underlying ideological exclusion and the use of classified evidence in
ideological exclusion and deportation proceedings, the INS continues to use
classified evidence against its most recent targets in the Muslim and Arab
communities. The context suggests that such use will go largely unchecked.
The significance of Congress' check on the executive and judicial branches in
the Knauff and Mezei cases cannot be underestimated. Without congressional
pressure, the abuses in the government's tactics of using secret evidence as a
cover for ideologically-motivated efforts to exclude would have flourished.
Even though the McCarthy-era legislation has been almost completely
repealed and Communist-based exclusion discredited, ideological exclusion
is far from dead. In the current "terrorism" hysteria and for complex reasons
which this article addresses, neither Congress nor the courts have provided
any meaningful check on the rampant abuses of the executive agencies' use
of such tactics.
IV.

SOME OF THE

Two

DOZEN CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION CASES

AGAINST ARABS AND MUSLIMS ILLUSTRATED

A.

The Initiationof the CurrentCases

Since the early 1990s, FBI and INS agents have launched widespread
investigations of Arab and Arab-American communities in major cities all
over the United States. Seeking information that would allegedly inform the
government about "terrorist" activities, agents in cities such as New York,
Detroit, Tampa, Los Angeles and San Francisco have threatened individuals
in the Arab and Arab-American communities that they would initiate deportation proceedings against them or their relatives if they did not "inform" on
friends, relatives, or neighbors."'
These efforts were stepped up immediately after the Oklahoma City
bombing in light of the immediate public and political reaction blaming Arab
terrorists for the tragedy. Although it soon became evident that the bombing
was the work of home-grown "terrorists," Congress and the Administration
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprising a number of far-reaching provisions designed to "combat
terrorism." "1 2 AEDPA authorizes the executive agencies to use sweeping
powers to investigate, charge, convict, and remove so-called "alien terrorists."' 13 Among AEDPA's provisions is one permitting the administration to
111. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 42-43.
112. See 141 CONG. REc. S2493-01, S2398 (1995); 141 CONG. REc. S7480 (daily ed. May 25, 1995);
141 CONG. REC. S7597 (1995). See also Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 23.
113. The "terrorist activity" and "terrorist organization" definitions are vague and subject to political
manipulation. The INA's reference to "alien terrorist" in the removal provision refers back to 8 U.S.C.
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criminally sanction even peaceful activities of groups the government labels
"terrorist organizations." 114 The State Department published its list of
terrorist organizations annually.' 15 Of the thirty organizations published on
that list, one third are either Muslim groups or from the Middle East or North
Africa.' 16 Under AEDPA, once a group is designated a "terrorist organization," none of its members are eligible for a visa, and any individual who has
been a member of that organization is deportable.' 1 7 Moreover, it is a crime
to contribute money or give material support to a designated "terrorist
organization," even if the support is for humanitarian or charitable purposes. 1 8 Finally, banks are required to freeze the funds of such an organization and its "agents."" 9 The most critical of AEDPA's provisions, for
purposes of this article, is the provision permitting the use of secret evidence
to remove or deport20 "alien terrorists" residing temporarily or permanently in
the United States.'

§ II 82(a)(3)(B)(iii), which defines "engaging in terrorist activity" as "to commit ... an act of terrorist
activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support to any
individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity." The Secretary of State can
designate any foreign organization a terrorist organization if she finds it is engaging in "terrorist activity"
threatening the "security of the United States nationals or the national security of the United States." INA
§ 219(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (1999). The INA defines "national security" as "the national defense,
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States." INA § 219(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2)
(1999). Thus, organizations engaging in both lawful and unlawful activity can be designated "terrorist"
based on purely political considerations that they threaten economic or foreign policy interests of the
United States. Such a definition gives the Administration virtually free reign to designate as terrorist any
group whose views it does not approve.
114. SeeINA§219,8U.S.C. § 1189(1994&Supp. II1996).
115. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (1999).
116. See id.; see also supra note 10 (listing Muslim and Arab groups designated terrorists organizations). Also included on the list are non-Muslim groups from the Middle East, including the Jewish groups
Kach and Kahane Chai, active in Israel. See 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112. Notably missing from the list is the Irish
Republican Army, which was not given a terrorist designation according to the State Department, because
it had announced an "unequivocal ceasefire," and because its political wing had initiated peace talks on
Northern Ireland. See 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1545 (1997). Ironically, the State Department has not
applied the selfsame reasons to exclude from the terrorist list those Palestinian groups which are part of the
umbrella Palestine Liberation Organization, which not only has entered into peace talks with Israel, but
has concluded three peace agreements. See The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (Oslo I), Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-Pal., 32 I.L.M. 1525; The Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-Pal., 36 I.L.M. 551 (Oslo II); Israel-Palestine Liberation Agreement on
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Oslo III), May 4, 1994, Isr.- the Pal., 33 I.L.M. 622; Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization: Wye River Memorandum, Interim Agreement, Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-Pal., 37 I.L.M.
1251; William Clinton & Hosni Mubarak, Summit Of Peacemakers: Sharm EI-Sheikh, Mar 13, 1996,
FinalStatement (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOqiO>.
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (V), amended by AEDPA, supra note 6.
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, amended by AEDPA § 303, supra note 6.
119. Under presidential executive order, it is illegal to have financial dealings with certain listed
foreign terrorist organizations; this scheme originated with a declaration of a state of emergency in
January 1995, and has been renewed each year. See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (1995),
extended by Continuation of Emergency Regarding Terrorists Who Threaten to the Disrupt Middle East
Peace Process, 63 Fed. Reg. 3445 (1998). The Secretary of State's list and the President's list under the
executive order appear in the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations, 31
C.F.R. Ch. V app. A (1999). The executive order requires all assets of designated foreign terrorist
organizations to be frozen in the United States. See 60 Fed. Reg. 5079. It also makes it a crime to have any
transactions concerning the property of such terrorist organizations in the United States. Id.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 111996).
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Rapidly following the passage of AEDPA, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"),
2
which also provided for the use of secret evidence in removal proceedings. '
These two recent pieces of legislation either explicitly-or according to INS
interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude
an "alien terrorist" under special removal proceedings, 22 to summarily
remove an alien who is a "national security" risk, 123 and to deny bond to
aliens in removal proceedings. 124
Strangely enough, the INS has not prosecuted a single case under the
special "alien terrorist" removal procedures authorized by AEDPA. Instead,
acting on the perceived authority of these provisions, the INS began relying
on a particular pre-IIRIRA provision in the immigration regulations 125 to
imply that the agency is authorized to use secret evidence in ordinary
deportation, exclusion, and removal proceedings. There are several obvious
consequences of the INS circumventing the "alien terrorist" removal procedures and bringing the secret evidence cases under 8 CFR § 240.33(c)(4)
instead. First, under the summary removal procedures, the INS must produce
an unclassified summary of the evidence to the alien.' 26 The regulation does
not clearly mandate such disclosure. Second, the alien terrorist removal
proceedings must be conducted by a federal judge, who would have the
authority to address constitutional challenges to the use of classified evidence. 127 By proceeding in the immigration courts, the INS avoids any
constitutional challenge to its tactics.' 28 Finally, if it brought these cases in
alien terrorist removal proceedings, the INS would actually have to charge
the aliens as "terrorists" and sustain its burden to prove that the aliens are
"engaged in... terrorist activity," rather than attempting to deport them for
mere membership, fundraising for political or charitable purposes, or association with unpopular organizations.

121. JIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-590 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B) (1999)). See also INA § 504(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1534(e)(3) (1999).
122. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (1996).
123.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(B) (1996).

124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2)(B) (1996).
125. See Application for Asylum or Withholding of Deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 240.33(c)(4) (1997)
("The Service counsel for the government may call witnesses and present evidence for the record,
including information classified under the applicable Executive Order, provided the immigration judge or
the Board has determined that such information is relevant to the hearing. The applicant shall be informed
when the immigration judge receives such classified information. The agency that provides the classified
information to the immigration judge may provide an unclassified summary of the information for release
to the applicant whenever it determines it can do so consistently with safeguarding both the classified
nature of the information and its source. The summary should be as detailed as possible, in order that the
applicant may have an opportunity to offer opposing evidence. A decision based in whole or in part on
such classified information shall state that such information is material to the decision.").
126. INA § 504(e)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (1999).
127. INA § 505(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (1999).
128. The BIA has long held that it cannot rule upon the constitutionality of the INA and the
Immigration Regulations. Matter of L, 4 1. & N. Dec. 556 (BIA 1951); Matter of Cenatice, 16 1. & N. Dec.
162 (BIA 1977); Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529 (BIA 1992); Matter of Fede, 20 1. & N. Dec. 25 (BIA
1989).
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The LA 8129 and Rafeedie 13 ° cases are the predecessors of the current
secret evidence cases, in which the INS seems to be pursuing a selective
strategy against Muslims and Arabs residing in this country. The INS began
deportation and exclusion proceedings against the LA 8 in 1987. The
government's charges were initially based on the McCarran-Walter Act's
ideological exclusion grounds. Stripped to their essence, the government's
charges amounted to a claim that the aliens read or distributed proPalestinian literature linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine ("PFLP"). All eight denied membership in the PFLP. The eight
were treated like convicted terrorists. 131
In the first decision on the merits of the case, Federal District Court Judge
Steven Wilson rejected the government's contentions and struck down the
32
ideological exclusion provisions as being unconstitutional and overbroad. 1
Applying the same First Amendment standard that would apply to the speech
and association rights of a citizen in such a context, the court found that
unless an alien's speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
33 such speech
lawless action and likely to incite or produce such action," 1134
otherwise.
or
deportation
of
chill
the
by
may not be curtailed
In congressional testimony, the former director of the FBI, and INS
regional counsel stated baldly that the government's attempts to deport the
LA 8 were based solely on their affiliation with the PFLP: "All of them were
arrested because they are alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist
organization which under the McCarran Act makes them eligible for deportation .... [I]n this particular case if these individuals had been United States
citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest."' 135 Upon
129. "LA 8" is the acronym for a series of cases involving the seven Palestinians and one Kenyan
arrested and placed in deportation proceedings in 1987. The litigation has continued for twelve years. The
LA 8 is also one of the current secret evidence cases under its latest incarnation. See AADC v. Meese, 714
F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, AADC v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th
Cir. 1991); AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
litigation discussed infra notes 278-308 and accompanying text.
130. See Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989), remandedto 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992).
131. See William Overend & Ronald L. Soble, 7 Tied to PLO Terrorist Wing Seized by INS, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1987, at 1; Ronald Soble, FBI Didn't Get Enough Data to Prosecute in Arab Case, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1989, at 3; Ronald Soble, Official's DualRole Taints Case AgainstAliens, Lawyer Charges,
L.A. TMEs, July 20, 1989, at 3; Ronald Soble, PLO Unit Has Been Quiet in This Country, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1987, at 3; see also Akram, supranote 10, at 1; Martella, supra note 19; Johnson, supra note 11.
132. The district court issued an order on May 21, 1987 and June 3, 1987, holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the 1952 Act claims of Hamide and Shahadeh because the claims were not yet ripe. See
AADC, 70 F.3d at 1053 (discussing the district court order). Hamide and Shahadeh unsuccessfully sought
review of the statute by mandamus. See Hamide v. United States District Court, No. 87-7249 (9th Cir. Feb.
24, 1988). When they again sought review in the district court, the court found that their facial and
as-applied constitutional challenges to the statute were not justiciable. See AADC, 714 F. Supp. 1060.
Ruling on the claims of the six in AADC v. Meese, the district court found the challenged statutory
provisions unconstitutionally over-broad. See id. On review, in AADC v. Thornburgh, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's holding on ripeness. See 970 F2d 501.
133. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
134. SeeAADC, 714 F Supp. 1060.
135. Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Nomination of William H.
Webster to be Directorof CentralIntelligence, 100th Cong. 94-95 (1987) (testimony of then-FBI Director
William Webster); see also DEMPSEY & CoLE, supranote 5, at 35.
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announcement that the INS intended to deport all eight plaintiffs because
they were members of the PFLP, all eight aliens filed a complaint charging
laws as retaliation for constitutionselective enforcement of the immigration
36
ally protected associational activity. 1
Meanwhile, in June 1987, Aiad Khaled Barakat and Naim Nadim Sharif,
two of the LA 8 respondents, applied for legalization under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") of 1986.137 The INS notified them that
their legalization applications were going to be denied because it had
concluded that they were excludable under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F)
based on secret evidence that they were not permitted to review. Barakat and
Sharif filed suit in district court challenging the use of secret evidence on
several grounds, including denial of due process. The district court, asserting
jurisdiction, issued a preliminary injunction against the confidential use of
classified information. Following an ex parte, in camera examination of
materials proffered by the INS, the court concluded that using such classified
information against Barakat and Sharif violated the Fifth Amendment's due
138
process guarantees and granted a permanent injunction against its use.
Then, in 1996, with the passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA's amendments to the
jurisdictional provisions of the INA, the INS filed a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, which the Court granted on the limited question of whether
the deportation
the federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to139
proceedings prior to the entry of a final order of deportation.
Partly in response to the District Court decision in the LA 8 case, Congress
amended the INA and repealed the McCarran-Walter provisions.140 Thereafter, the INS instituted new proceedings against the LA 8 based on nonideological grounds, adding new terrorism charges under the amendments by
IMMACT 90.141 Terrorist activity under the new grounds is defined as: "I[T]o
commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act
of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows or reasonably should
know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or govern, 4 The language
ment in conducting a terrorist activity at any time ....
136. The FBI conducted a 3 and a half year investigation against the LA 8 before turning the case over
to the INS for lack of evidence which the FBI could use to criminally prosecute. See DEMPSEY & COLE,
supra note 5, at 37-38. During the FISA litigation, the INS and FBI admitted to wiretapping not only the
conversations of the LA 8, but their attorneys' conversations with them as well. Robert A. Dawson,
Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1380, 1398 (1993). The sum total of the INS' evidence against the LA 8 was that the aliens
had distributed pro-Palestinian literature which was widely available at newsstands.
137. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
138. See AADC v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
139. See Reno v. AADC, 118 S.Ct. 2059 (1998).
140. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, INA § 212(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1990).
Under the 1990 provisions, aliens could not be denied visas based on ideology, affiliation or membership.
However, two problems persist: the new "terrorist" ground is defined so broadly as to permit the INS to
interpret mere membership as sufficient for excludability; and officials of the PLO are still excepted from
the provisions. INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § i 182(a)(3) (1999).
141. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1990).
142. Id.

1999]

TALES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION

permits the INS to deport or exclude an individual who has supported or
given money to an organization for its legal, social, or charitable activities if
any arm of that organization also has engaged in terrorism.' 4 3
The Rafeedie case involved three persons of Palestinian origin who
returned to the United States after a two-week trip to the Middle East. The
INS arrested them in April 1986, charging them with excludability for
attending a conference in Syria sponsored by the Palestine Youth Organization, affiliated with the (PFLP). The two returning resident aliens were
charged under the McCarran Walter provisions: sections 212(a)(27)-(29) of
the INA.' 44 The third, a U.S. citizen, could not be charged for any criminal
activity. One of the aliens was forced to leave, but Fouad Rafeedie, a
twenty-year resident of the United States, contested the charges against
him. 14 5 The INS brought its case against Rafeedie as a summary exclusion
proceeding, which allowed it to proceed without a hearing and without
providing its evidence in open court or on the record. 146 The INS claimed that
it could not disclose its evidence against Rafeedie because to do so would be
"prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security
47
of the United States." 1
The D.C. Circuit rejected both the INS' use of secret evidence and its
grounds for excluding Rafeedie.1 48 It expressed extreme displeasure with the
INS' attempt to use classified evidence and refused to hear it. 14 9 It remanded
the case instructing the application of the due process analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge in deciding whether the government's national security interests
outweighed Rafeedie's First1 Amendment rights.' 50 On remand, the District
15
Court found for Rafeedie.
Until the passage of URIRA and AEDPA, both aspects of the INS' efforts
to deport and exclude Arabs for their speech and association were struck
down by the lower courts: ideological-based grounds for deportation/
exclusion, and the use of secret evidence in the proceedings. And while the
lower courts and circuit courts in the LA 8 and Rafeedie cases substantially
curbed the INS' ability to use various INA provisions to deport or exclude on

143. The LA 8 are the only aliens whom the INS has ever sought to deport under these "terrorism"
provisions. See David Cole, Guilt By Association: It's Alive and Well at the INS, THE NATION, Feb. 15,
1993, at 198-99.
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(27)-(29)(1982)
145. See Rafeedie v. INS, 688 E Supp. 729, 742-43 (D.D.C. 1988).
146. The authority for summary exclusion proceedings under the INA provisions in force during the
Rafeedie case was INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c), and covered only exclusion or deportation on
grounds of subversion or the ideological grounds of McCarran-Walter. The Rafeedie case was the first case
in which summary exclusion was ever used against a lawful permanent resident. Rafeedie, 688 F Supp. At
742-43.
147. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 734.
148. See id. at 729.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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ideological grounds, the passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA has seriously eroded
the courts' power to provide such checks in the future.
The current secret evidence cases arise primarily in deportation/removal/
exclusion proceedings in which the INS proffers secret evidence to deny
aliens' applications for asylum or any other form of discretionary relief. The
only cases in which the INS has actually charged the aliens with "terrorism"
are those of the LA 8. In none of the other cases has the INS actually charged
the alien with terrorism. Instead, the agency has merely alluded to terrorist
activities as being the motivation for the classification of the proffered
evidence.
B.

Illustrationsfrom Secret Evidence Cases Currently Being Litigated

Six of the more recent cases illustrate the contexts in which the INS is
using classified evidence in the deportation, exclusion, or removal of aliens
from the Arab or Muslim world.
1. Nasser Ahmed
Nasser Ahmed, a native of Egypt and father of three U.S. citizen children,
was a court-appointed translator for the defense team of Sheik Abdel Rahman
in the trial for seditious conspiracy to bomb facilities and buildings in New
York City. During that trial, the FBI and INS attempted to convince Ahmed to
assist them in investigating Sheik Abdel Rahman, who led prayers in the
mosque where Ahmed worshipped. The government agents who contacted
Ahmed threatened him with deportation if he did not cooperate; but Ahmed
refused to assist them in their investigation. 52 On April 23, 1996, Ahmed
was arrested by the INS, placed in custody, and has remained in solitary
confinement in a New York City jail since then.1 53 The INS has opposed
parole from custody and his application for political asylum based on
classified evidence which it claims indicates he is a security threat to the
154
United States.
2. Mazen Al-Najjar
Mazen A1-Najjar was placed in deportation proceedings on a charge of
visa overstay in May 1997, after residing in the United States since 1981.
Al-Najjar was the editor-in-chief of the research journal of the World and
Islam Studies Enterprise ("WISE"), a think tank based at the University of
South Florida, engaged in promoting open dialogue on issues relating to the
Middle East. Al-Najjar was arrested as part of an investigation by the FBI

152.
153.
154.

See DEMPSEY & COLE, supranote 5, at 129.
See id.
See id.
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after a former administrator of WISE became head of the Islamic Jihad.155
The FBI and INS arrested Al-Najjar and detained him on the basis of secret
evidence. He remains in detention in a Tampa jail on the basis of the INS'

undisclosed evidence. 156
3.

Hany Kiareldeen

Hany Kiareldeen was, like Mazen A1-Najjar, charged with visa overstay in
March 1998.'1 7 A native of Gaza, he moved to the United States in 1990 and
had lawful permanent resident status. He was taken into INS custody in New
Jersey, and his bond re-determination request was denied on the basis of
secret evidence.15 8 He applied for asylum and relief under the Convention
against Torture ("Torture Convention").1 59 During the proceedings, Kiareldeen was given an unclassified summary of the INS' evidence, a onepage document stating that "he is a suspected member of a terrorist
organization," that he "associated" with someone involved in the World
Trade Center bombing, and that he had made a "credible threat" against the

life of Attorney General Janet Reno.1 60 On April 2, 1999, the Immigration
Court ruled in favor of Kiareldeen, finding that the secret evidence was not
probative of the government's charges, and granting him asylum. The
government appealed, and Hany Kiareldeen remained in INS custody until
recently.
On October 20, 1999, in a decision that may influence the way other
federal courts approach these cases, Federal Judge William H. Walls found
the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings unconstitutional and
ordered that Kiareldeen be released. 161 In the order, Judge Walls stated, "the
INS' reliance on evidence never disclosed to the petitioner violated every
tenet of due process." 1 6 2 Judge Walls further stated that "[r]eview of the
[INS'] procedures involving Kiareldeen leads the court to believe the dangers
of secret evidence .... Use of secret evidence creates a one-sided process by
163
which the protections of our adversarial system are rendered impotent."
155. The FBI apparently targeted the Muslim community in Tampa for a period of four years, looking
for evidence that money raised in the United States was being sent to terrorist groups in the Middle East.
See John F. Sugg, Secret Evidence, THE LINK (Americans for Middle East Understanding, New York,
N.Y.), July-Aug. 1999, at 3. No such evidence was found, no charges were ever filed based on this
investigation, and the investigation simply wound down. Recently-retired chief of FBI counterterrorism,
Bob Blitzer, stated that although the investigation revealed that WISE's Muslim academics supported
Palestinian causes, "no federal laws were broken." Id.
156. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 132.
157. See Sugg, supra note 155, at 12.
158.

See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 135.

159. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
160. See Kit Gage, Other Secret Evidence Cases, THE LINK (Americans for Middle East Understanding, New York, N.Y.), July-Aug. 1999, at 12.
161. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 1999 WL956289 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999).
162. Id.at *8.
163. ld. at'11-12.
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The Iraqi Seven

In March 1997, the U.S. government flew 6000 Iraqi Kurds out of Iraq to
Guam, processed their asylum claims in Guam, and brought them to the
United States. These Iraqis had participated in a CIA-backed effort to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. When the coup failed, the United States set up a
special program to resettle them. 64 Seven of the Iraqis were placed in
exclusion proceedings on the basis that they entered without valid visas, and
were detained in Southern California on the basis that they were "security
risks" to the United States. 16 5 The INS refused to produce the evidence to
support the security risk claim on the basis that the evidence was classified.
The Los Angeles IJ hearing the cases reviewed the secret evidence, agreed
with the government, and ordered the men excluded. 166 Meanwhile, all of the
family members of the seven had been granted asylum in the US. 1 6 7 Despite
the suspect nature of the government's secret evidence and the lack of
probative evidence to support the government's charges against the Iraqis,
the INS kept the men in detention for two years. Five of the Iraqis have now
entered into a settlement agreement with the INS, conditioning their release
to asylum and finding third countries which
on withdrawal of their claims
68
'
them.
accept
to
agree
will
5.

Imad Hamad

Imad Hamad is a stateless Palestinian born in Lebanon. He first entered the
United States in 1980, married a U.S. citizen, and applied for adjustment. His
adjustment was denied in 1985 on discretionary grounds based on his
supposed affiliation with the PFLP. The INS initiated deportation proceedings in 1988. At that time, the INS indicated its charges were based on
Hamad's participation in demonstrations and fundraisers concerning Palestinian causes. 1 6 9 In 1989, he was denied asylum, withholding, and suspension of
deportation, but granted voluntary departure.' 70 Hamad then applied to
adjust his status on the basis of his second marriage, but the INS opposed his
application based on classified evidence the agency claimed showed he was a
national security threat. On February 19, 1999, the BIA rendered a final
decision in the case, affirming the IJ's grant of adjustment of status.
' 7'
Meanwhile, Hamad has been in deportation proceedings for over ten years.
164. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5,at 136.
165. See id. at136-37.
at137.
166. See id.
167. See id. at136.
168. The five men will live in Nebraska with their families, who have been granted asylum. See Gage,
supra note 160, at 13. They have agreed to remain confined in their homes, to allow monitoring of their
telephones, and to permit the government to search their homes at its will. Id.
169. See DEMPSEY& COLE, supra note 5, at 133; see also In re Imad Salih Hamad (BIA Feb. 19,1999)
(unpublished decision on file with author).
170. In re Imad Salih Hamad,at 2.
171.

See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5,at134.
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6. Anwar Haddam
Anwar Haddam's case is, in many ways, a classic example of how the
government's strategy in its so-called war on terrorism is driven by a
disguised ideological bias. Haddam, a forty-four year old native and citizen
of Algeria, was elected to a seat in the Algerian parliament in 1991-in what
were widely acknowledged to be the first free and fair elections in Algerian
history. In December 1991, before the final round of elections, the President
of Haddam's party, the Islamic Salvation Front ("FIS"), was put under house
arrest, the elections were annulled, and the army took power. Thousands of
FIS supporters were put in desert concentration camps, tortured and killed in
prison, or executed by the Algerian
military government, as Algeria de72
scended into a state of civil war.'
With his life seriously at risk, Haddam fled Algeria for Europe in
March 1992, leaving behind his wife and three children, who could
not get out of Algeria safely with him at that time. In December 1992,
the family was reunited and legally entered the United States on valid
visitors visas. Haddam applied for political asylum in April 1993 in Chicago. 173 During the pendency of his asylum application, Haddam was
given seven grants of advance parole to depart and return to the United
States, each of which required a specific public interest finding.1 74 His
affirmative asylum application was not granted, but under the existing
Regulations, his case was referred to the Immigration Court for a hearing.
Nevertheless, Haddam was arrested and taken into custody even before his
parole was revoked and without proper notice of revocation of the parole
status. 175
In exclusion proceedings (pre-IIRIRA), he applied for asylum and withholding, but the INS claimed he was ineligible for such relief on the basis that
he was a persecutor of others. 176 At the initiation of its proceedings, the INS
stipulated that Haddam had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to
Algeria. 17 7 Thus, the single issue in this case was not whether Haddam would
be persecuted, but whether he was barred from asylum because by his speech
or silence he was a persecutor of others. In support of its claim, the INS
produced voluminous documents through which it sought to show that
Haddam was responsible for countless violent acts in Algeria since 1992 and

172. See In re Anwar Haddam, No. A22-751-813, at 2-3 (BIA Sept. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Haddam
BIA Appeal] (unpublished decision on file with author); see also Appellant's Brief at 2-5, Haddam BIA
Appeal.

173. See Haddam BIA Appeal, supranote 172, at 2; see also Appellant's Brief, supranote 172, at 3.
174. The INS granted him seven advance paroles on the basis of his specific explanations that the
purpose of his trips was to carry on his political activities on behalf of FIS: to attend international
conferences, make speeches, and attend meetings as the Representative of the FIS Parliamentary
Delegation in the United States. See Haddam BIA Appeal, supra note 172, at 2.
175. See id. at 2-3; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 172, at 3.
176.

See Haddam BIA Appeal, supranote 172, at 1-3.

177.

See id. at 3; Appellant's Brief, supra note 172, at 4.
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sought to proffer classified evidence ex parte, in camera to the IJ.' 78 The IJ
did not consider the secret evidence, which he thought to be "fundamentally
unfair," but denied asylum and withholding on the written record. However,
the IJ determined that Haddam could not be excluded and deported without
violating the provisions of the Torture Convention. 179 Both sides appealed.
The BIA, in an extraordinarily thorough decision, found Haddam not to be a
persecutor of others,' 80 but remanded for the IJ to determine whether the
secret evidence had any relevance to the test set out in the BIA's decision for
a persecutor of others finding.' 8' The case remained on remand until July
1999. The case is once again on appeal to the BIA. Anwar Haddam remains
in detention, where he has been for over 2 and a half years, with no evidence
against him to justify detention other than what the INS insists is properlyclassified evidence. Haddam believes this evidence to consist of his own
exculpatory telephone conversations.
Meanwhile, Haddam has filed two petitions for writs of habeas corpus
demanding his release.1 82 The petitions, both filed in the Federal District
Court, Eastern District of Virginia, were heard by District Court Judge T.S.
Ellis. The grounds for the habeas petitions were that the District Director had
no legitimate basis in the record for continuing Haddam's detention for
several reasons. First, there were successive advisory opinions and letters

178. The INS produced 205 exhibits in support of its case in the first proceeding before IJ Bryant. The
exhibits included: (1) 26 articles directly from Algerian news sources, censored by the Algerian military
junta, containing statements Haddam denied making, Trial record gov't exhibits 14, 61, 63, 65-75, 77, 90,
103, 106, 112, 113, 130, 160, 173, 177, 179 & 188, In re Haddam, No. A22-751-813 (Va., EOIR, Immigr.
Ct. July 14, 1997) (Bryant, IJ) [hereinafter Haddam Immigr Ct. I] (on file with author); (2) 47 articles with
statements Haddam claimed seriously distorted his actual statements or that he never admitted making,
Trial record gov't exhibits 23, 28-30, 36, 43, 45-47, 49, 51-53, 55, 57, 58, 61,65, 70, 71, 75, 80, 85, 86, 92,
97, 100, 101, 110,122, 128, 130, 137, 154,156-58, 170a, 179,181,191 & 194; (3) unsworn and unsigned
affidavits of unidentified witnesses purporting to lay the blame for the violence in Algeria on Haddam and
FIS, Trial record gov't exhibits 200 & 204; (4) affidavit testimony of "experts" who were clearly
unqualified to give opinions about Algeria, Trial record gov't exhibits 129, 202 & 203; (4) mistranslated
documents which purport to link Haddam to the GIA and other armed militants when the only apparent
link was through false government-proffered translations, Trial record gov't exhibits 81, 82a, 147, 148, 84,
161-65; and (5) completely irrelevant documents implying a link between Haddam and some sort of
international "Islamic jihad," Trial record gov't exhibits 13, 114, 103, 115, 127, 140, 155, 166, 169.
179. See Torture Convention, supra note 159.
180. See Haddam BIA Appeal, supra note 172 ("The evidence produced in this case is too attenuated
to support the conclusion that the applicant 'ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.' Section 101(a)(42)(B) of the Act. Because the evidence provided by the
Service did not indicate that the applicant had engaged in such conduct, we find that the applicant never
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that he did not so act.").
181. The BIA adopted the three-part test suggested by respondent to determine whether an individual
is a persecutor of others under INA §§ 101(a)(42)(B), 208(a), & 243(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)(42)(B),
1158(a), & 1253(h)(2)(A) (1999), and thus barred from the relief of withholding or political asylum. The
analysis adopted by the BIA to determine whether someone has "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution [of others] .... " requires: (1) a volitional act with intent to persecute; (2)
proof of a nexus between the acts of the individual and the violent activities; and (3) the violent activities
must be "persecution" as defined under US law. See Haddam BIA Appeal, supra note 172, at 11-18. See
also Appellant's Brief, supra note 172, at 6-22.
182. See Haddam v. Carroll, Civ. No. 97-45-A (E.D. Va. 1997); Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 602
(E.D. Va. 1999).
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from the Department of State stating that there was no reason to deny him
asylum. Second, these letters stated that the Algerian government had
provided no legitimate basis for its arrest warrants against him. Finally,
specific findings of public interest in granting him advance parole had been
made on seven previous occasions.
The second habeas, filed after the BIA rendered its decision, was grounded
on additional later-discovered evidence, previously withheld by the INS
despite three Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests, consisting of a
State Department opinion concluding that it was specifically not in the public
interest to continue his detention and an INS General Counsel opinion stating
that there was no evidence to support denying asylum to Anwar Haddam. On
habeas,1 83
June 23, 1999, Federal District Court Judge T.S. Ellis denied the1 84
and on July 1, 1999, IJ Churchill denied asylum and withholding.
C. InstitutionalBias Against Arabs and Muslims Evident in the Tactics
and Strategiesof the Secret Evidence Cases
A theme which permeates the current secret evidence deportation cases is
an anti-Muslim, anti-Arab bias or racism on the part of the two main
government agencies involved: the INS and the FBI. In many of the cases,
INS is being pressured by the BIA, the immigration courts, or adverse
publicity to declassify the evidence it has claimed is classified. From the
evidence that has come to light through declassification and subsequent
production, it is apparent that it was wrongly classified in the first place.
Much of the evidence appears to be based on biased or unreliable sources,
deliberately or mistakenly falsified translations, and foreign government
pressure. But most troublesome is that the tactics the government is using in
these cases appear to be driven by a clear institutionalized bias on the part of
the agencies involved. Some of these tactics are reviewed here.
1. Lack of Evidentiary Supportfor INS Charges andAllegations
Some of the most graphic examples of this bias within the INS appear in
the INS' pleadings filed in the secret evidence cases. Among the allegations
which the INS made in Haddam's case were:
The Service has introduced evidence of the atrocities committed by
four armed groups: the FIS, the AIS, the FIDA, and the GIA ... The

Service evidence clearly shows that the applicant has a leadership
position in each group, notwithstanding what he has testified to this
court ...

[W]hat they have actually engaged in is a reign of terror on

innocent people... The Service contends that Mr. Haddam heads up an
183. See Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 1999)
184. See In re Haddam, No. A22-751-813 (Va., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. May 12, 1999) (Churchill, IJ)
[hereinafter Haddam Immigr Ct. 11] (on file with author).

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:51

international group of individuals devoted to funneling arms into
Algeria to destroy the nation .... 185
The Service never produced any evidence connecting the FIS to any of the
alleged atrocities. Nor did it produce any evidence (other than its own
falsely-translated documents) that Haddam had a leadership position in any
group besides FIS. As for the last contention, that Haddam headed up a group
which was funneling arms to destroy Algeria, the only support for that was
the government's false translation of a French Letter Rogatory, and its proffer
that it would provide FBI agent testimony about the contents of Haddam's
Arabic telephone conversations ex parte, in camera, to the court.
The INS' brief then alleges that Haddam is a member of a group waging
"Islamic jihad."
The Service's evidence shows that their jihad is not aimed only at the
government they seek to overthrow, but at innocent women who refuse
to wear the Islamic veil, journalists that write articles that don't favor
the views of these armed Islamic groups, intellectuals who hold
different political opinions and the wives and children of Algerian
security force members solely because of their family relationships.
Their jihad is aimed at innocent civilians who refuse to abide by the
extremist religious rules that the Applicant's groups have imposed on
the Algerian society .... 186

185. INS Brief submitted in Closing Argument at 5, Haddam BIA Appeal, supra note 172.
186. Id. The INS never submitted evidence or expert testimony proving FIS was engaged in an
"Islamic jihad." Haddam submitted the expert testimony of two of the world's best-known experts on
Algeria: Graham Fuller, Senior Political Scientist at RAND and ex-National Intelligence Officer for the
Near East and South Asia at the CIA; and Francois Burgat, Social Scientist at the French National Center
for Scientific Research, and Senior Scientist at the Institute on the Arab and Muslim World. See Statements
of Graham Fuller and Francois Burgat in Transcript, Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178. The relevant
conclusions of these experts in Haddam's case were: (i) Algeria is in a state of civil war caused by the
military's coup d'etat and cancellation of democratic elections in which FIS was overwhelmingly
victorious. (Burgat, at 12, Fuller, at 1); (ii) In the aftermath of the coup, the military outlawed FIS, closed
its publications and violently repressed the FIS, rounding up 20,000-30,000 FIS members and supporters
and putting them in camps in the Sahara desert and killing, imprisoning and torturing others. This violence
by the government ultimately led to a violent response from the opposition (Burgat, at 21, 23-25; Fuller, at
1,4); (iii) FIS tried to control the violence and maintain a political agenda between 1994-95. Certain
leaders within FIS left to join the GIA in an attempt to reign in the GIA, and these leaders were
assassinated by the GIA in November 1995, ending the relationship between the two groups (Burgat at
28-30, 40-41, 106; Fuller at 5-6); (iv) there is simply no evidence that FIS or Haddam personally have
control over the situation in Algeria including any direction or control over the violence of GIA or any
other armed group (Burgat, at 102; Fuller, at 6); (v) there is violence on both sides of the current conflict; (vi) the Rome Agreement sponsored by the St. Egidio Society represents the single most important consensus among 7 Algerian political parties, including the FIS, representing 80% or more
of the Algerian electorate on a peaceful solution to the crisis in Algeria. Haddam, according to both Fuller
and Burgat, played an important role in the formulation of the Rome Agreement which reflects a
commitment to democracy, pluralism, human rights and non-violence (Burgat, at 43-44). The INS never
produced a credible expert to show the existence of an "Islamic jihad"-let alone one in which Haddam
participated.

1999]

TALES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION

2.

The Submission of MistranslatedDocuments
and Oral Testimony as Evidence

The INS engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout the Haddam case
in an effort to make a connection with Islamic "terrorism" that was never
supported by record evidence. Such misconduct, in order to support an
implied terrorist connection, has been rampant in the other secret evidence
cases as well. 187 In the initial immigration court hearings, the INS submitted
at least eight materially mistranslated documents to show a connection
between Haddam and the GIA,' 8 8 which was only supported by the false
information in the INS-proffered translations. 189 In addition to offering other
falsely-translated documents, the INS offered a materially mistranslated
187. See, e.g., Imad Hamad Wins At BIA-Can Seek Green Card, UPDATE (National Coalition to
Protect Political Freedom, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 20, 1999, at 5 (describing how the INS claimed that it
had a photograph depicting Haddam wearing a shirt bearing words and symbols proving his membership
in a terrorist organization and how, upon inspection, it was clear that neither the design nor the Arabic
message on his shirt depicted what the INS had alleged); The National Security ConsiderationsInvolved
in Asylum Applications: Hearings Before the Tech., Terrorism and Gov't Info. Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of James R. Woolsey) [hereinafter Woolsey
Statement] ("In navigating this predictably treacherous ground, the government's lack of competence and
lack of professionalism has been appalling. Government witnesses got confused about the difference
between Iraq and Iran .... Translation between English and Arabic during the interrogations was so bad
on occasion that one man spent a year in prison, this is Mr. Hawleri, because an interpreter flippantly
invented an acronym and produced confusion about a Kurdish organization.").
188. The GIA is on the State Department list of "terrorist" organizations. See Designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112 (1999). Haddam has always denied any connection
with the GIA; his only link with the GIA was that between 1994-95 when his party, FIS, was negotiating
with the GIA-as he put it "to try to reign in the violence." Haddam supported those negotiations. He
testified repeatedly in his immigration proceedings that he supported those efforts because he wanted the
"terrorism" in Algeria curbed. He also testified repeatedly that he opposed any formal association
between GIA and FIS and opposed FIS having any armed wing. When members of FIS joined the GIA
during that time, Anwar Haddam was the one who demanded that they resign from FIS before joining so
that there would never be a formal link between the two. The FIS members who joined GIA were killed by
the GIA, and FIS withdrew from any further dealings with GIA. Haddam then disavowed that the GIA had
any legitimate role to play as "mujahidin," or a "righteous group of fighters for a just cause." Haddam
BIA Appeal, supra note 172, at 4-5; see also Appellant's Brief at 9-10. Haddam's party, FIS, has never
been named as a "terrorist" organization by any branch of the U.S. government. Haddam was threatened
with death by the GIA in a communiqu6 in 1995, and the FBI took the threat so seriously it met with
Haddam on July 21, 1995 and offered him personal protection. Haddam BIA Appeal, supra note 172, at 5;
Appellant's Brief at 10.
189. A Declarationof the GIA, Government exhibit 147, Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178, was
materially mistranslated by the Government. Under Haddam's signature, the original Arabic document
contains the words "Parliamentary Delegation of the FIS." The Government falsely translated this as
"Parliamentary Delegation of the GIA." Trial record gov't exhibit 147. "GIAAnnouncement of Orthodox
Caliphate" was offered with a materially false translation that implied that Haddam was the "Minister of
Foreign Relations of the GIA," when no such designation appears on the original document. Id. Similarly,
Trial record gov't exhibits 161, 164-65 were offered with material erroneous translations. Haddam offered
corrected translations by a qualified translator of all these documents, but neither the U nor the BIA ruled
on the accuracy of the translations. It simply defies belief that all these mistranslations were innocent
errors, when they all draw the same connection between Anwar Haddam and the GIA-a connection for
which there is no evidence at all in the original Arabic documents. Counsel for Haddam raised these false
translations and other known misrepresentations of the government as evidence of malfeasance throughout this case. However, since there are no real sanctions available for INS misconduct, such challenges
remain fruitless. For example, the immigration regulations, although containing a number of sanctions
against private counsel, have no provisions for sanctions against counsel for the government. See
Discipline of Attorneys and Representatives, 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (1999). Section 292.3(2) requires the
referral of all complaints for "frivolous behavior" against Service Counsel to the Department of Justice's
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Letter Rogatory to the effect that Haddam was under indictment in France
concerning an investigation involving alleged terrorism in France. The
original French document indicates that Haddam was sought for questioning.
There was no suggestion that he was under indictment. 190
3. Improperand Unethical Conduct by the Government: Erroneous
Classificationof NonclassifiedMaterial;Refusal to Comply
with Judicial Orders and ProceduralRequirements
When Nasser Ahmed was arrested in April 1996, he was held without
bond,1 9 ' even though the INS' charge against Ahmed was a routine visa
overstay. His request for bond redetermination was denied on secret evidence
produced in camera, ex parte by the INS. 92 In his asylum proceedings, he
was found deportable solely on the strength of the secret evidence as a
"danger to the security of the U.S."' 19 3 In those proceedings, the INS
produced a one-sentence summary of the secret evidence, which stated that
the government had evidence "concerning respondent's association with a
known terrorist organization." 194 But Ahmed was granted voluntary departure. 195 He appealed to the BIA 196 and also brought habeas corpus and
injunctive action in Federal District Court in the Southern District of New
York.

Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). See id. There have been no successful challenges to the
behavior of INS counsel through the OPR.
190. There are several examples of Government misconduct in its handling of the Letter Rogatory
that were discussed in Appellant's Brief. The most serious, however, was its translation of the
mis-en-examen proceedings in France as meaning that Haddam was an "indicted target" of the
investigation. Haddam offered the testimony of Professor Carbonneau, a professor of International and
Comparative Law at Tulane Law School and an expert in French law, to refute the Government's proffer of
the meaning of a "mis-en-examen" proceeding, but the U never took Professor Carbonneau's testimony.
The Government also offered a translation of the Statement of Facts concerning the investigation as
indicating that "two metal rods of explosives" were found in an apartment in France whose inhabitants
apparently knew Haddam. The French document actually says that "a handwritten sheet of paper on the
subject of integrated circuits and explosives" was found in the apartment. No explosives were found in the
apartment mentioned in the Statement of Facts. Haddam offered corrected translations of all the French
documents through a highly qualified interpreter, but neither the U nor the BIA ruled on the accuracy of
the translations. Most telling of all in relation to the French investigation is that the actual target of the
investigation, a Mr. Boudjadaar, who was arrested in the apartment in which the sheet of paper was found,
was released without further charges or prosecution. Information obtained by the author as Haddam's
counsel from French counsel in the Boudjadaar case.
191. Ahmed entered the U.S. in 1983. He was arrested by the INS in 1995 and charged as deportable
for remaining beyond his authorized period of stay, but was released after posting a bond of $15,000. See
In re Nasser Ahmed, 1 (N.Y., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. May 1, 1996) (mem.) (bond determination proceedings).
On April 23, 1996, while going to attend the immigration hearing, Ahmed was arrested and detained
without bond under 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1996). Ahmed requested bond re-determination and applied for
asylum and withholding of deportation based on his fear that if deported to Egypt, he would be persecuted
because of his public association with Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. See In re Nasser Ahmed, at 9.
192. See id. at 3-4.
193. See id. at 22.
194. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 129.
195. See In re Nasser Ahmed, at 24.
196. The BIA denied Ahmed's appeal for Bond Redetermination. In re Nasser Ahmed, No. A90 674
238 (BIA Sept. 1996).
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As a result of the federal court action, the INS released some of the
information it had previously said was too sensitive to disclose. It indicated
that Ahmed was allegedly associated with an Egyptian opposition group,
Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya, and that he was allegedly associated with Sheik
Rahman. Again, the unclassified evidence did not indicate that Ahmed was
involved in any illegal activity himself.1 97 When both the federal court and
the BIA indicated that Ahmed needed another opportunity to respond to the
de-classified evidence, the INS suddenly disclosed yet more of its secret
evidence, with new allegations.
The government's evidence on remand reflected four allegations: (1)
Ahmed's alleged association with Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya; (2) Ahmed's
alleged efforts to send a bomb-making manual overseas; (3) Ahmed's alleged
efforts to relay a call to violence from Sheik Omar Rahman to the public; and
(4) Ahmed's alleged threats against Mohammad Al-Sharif, one of the imams
at the Abu Bakr Mosque in Brooklyn. 19 8 On the first allegation, Ahmed's
association with Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya, the government's evidence apparently confused the distinction between Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya and alGama'at al-Islamiyya. Ahmed's expert witness indicated that the former was
a specific organization, "The Islamic Group," while the latter is a collection
of hundreds of groups, which are loosely called "The Islamic Groups" and
include groups opposing the political government as well as social welfare,
health, and community organizations.' 99 The court found Ahmed's denials of
any membership in Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya persuasive and membership in
or affiliation with al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya irrelevant. 2 °
On the second allegation, that Ahmed "made efforts to obtain a bombmaking manual to send overseas," Ahmed agreed that he had obtained a
bomb-making manual. It was given to him by Clover Barrett, one of the
defense attorneys in the World Trade Center bombing case, for Ahmed to
translate as the court-appointed translator. Ms. Barrett provided corroborating testimony about that on remand.2 °1
On the third allegation, the INS provided in camera evidence that Ahmed
carried a message from Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, which was published in
the press, and that three days later, eighteen tourists were killed and
seventeen wounded in Cairo.2 °2 It was only when this evidence was revealed
on remand that Ahmed had the opportunity to effectively respond. He
produced the actual letter of Sheik Rahman, which was completely unrelated
197. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 130.
198. In re NasserAhmed, at 2 (N.Y, EOIR, Immigr. Ct. July 30, 1999) (decision following remand).
199. "The court finds the distinction between al-Gama'a and al-Gama'at to be an important [one] ...
Hicks pointed out that the Egyptian government does not distinguish between the violent and non-violent
supporters of al-Gama'at. Indeed, it would appear that even the U.S. State Department has blurred the
distinction in its designation of terrorist organizations [cites to the record omitted]" Id. at 4 (summary of
testimony of expert witness Neil Hicks).
200.

See id. at 4.

201.
202.

Seeid. at6.
See id. at 5.
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to the killing and wounding of the tourists in Egypt. He also produced a letter
from the individuals claiming responsibility for the killings-a letter which
was independently verified for authenticity-which showed that the Sheik
had no connection with those murders. That fact was verified by the U.S.
Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Christopher Ross. 2 °3
Aside from Ahmed's own denials, which the court found persuasive, he was
also able to show that many people had contact with Sheik Rahman in the
days and weeks before the publication of the letter.2°
As for the final allegation, the supposed threats by Ahmed against Sheik
Al-Sharif, the court had this to say following the remand and additional
testimony:
It is obvious that there is a bitter and implacable conflict between the
respondent, who supports the chief religious opponent of the present
Egyptian government, and Sheik Al-Sharif, who appears to have
regular contact with the Egyptian government representatives in New
York... Sheik A1-Sharif's interest in employment by the mosque and
his interest in remaining in the United States would be threatened by
respondent's release from INS custody [because Ahmed opposed continuing A1-Sharif's employment as imam at the mosque upon which
INS approval of his employment-based visa was contingent]. Sheik
Al-Sharif has a substantial interest in seeing that the respondent
remains in INS custody and that he be deported from the United States.
Accordingly, Sheik Al-Sharif is considered by this court to be seriously
prejudiced against respondent, highly interested in the outcome of this
case and he appears to be under the control of the INS which holds his
future immigration status in its hands. Under these circumstances, I
cannot give substantial weight to testimony of Sheik Al-Sharif regarding the actions of the respondent.20 5
Following three years of battling the taint of being considered a security
threat while he remained in custody, Ahmed was ultimately able, once the
government's so-called classified evidence was revealed, to discredit all the
government's evidence and each one of its allegations. IJ Livingston and the
BIA were ultimately successful in pressuring the government to reassess its
security classification of the evidence, resulting in more and more declassifi-

203. Christopher Ross' affidavit stated: "The (al-Gama'a) claimed responsibility for the attack in a
fax dated April 19, explaining that it thought the Greeks were Israeli tourists. The attack was in retaliation
for fighting occurring in southern Lebanon at the time." Record at Exhibit R-5-5 23, In re Nasser Ahmed
(N.Y., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. July 30, 1999) (decision following remand) (on file with author)
204. See In re NasserAhmed, at 5 (July 30, 1999) (decision following remand).
205. In re Nasser Ahmed, at 7 (N.Y., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. July 30, 1999) (decision following remand).
The court also opined: "Additionally, I find that the internal affairs of the mosque do not implicate any
legitimate national security concerns of the United States. If, indeed, the parties in the mosque's struggles
hurl insults and threats at each other, it would seem that the matter could be adequately handled by the
criminal or civil court system in Brooklyn, New York." Id.
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cation of information. The decision strongly suggests that most of the
evidence was never appropriately classified in the first place. Yet the INS
maintains: "Classified evidence is introduced and considered in less than 20
out of nearly 300,000 cases adjudicated by the immigration courts each
year." 20 6 "Determinations to use classified evidence are made on a case by
case basis without regard to aliens' religion, nationality or ethnic origin, and
are based solely upon national security considerations. The INS firmly
believes that it would be wrong to consider such characteristics 2in
deciding
07
whether to use classified information in a particular proceeding.
In the Iraqi cases, the INS' reliance on secret evidence showed similar
dissimulation. Niels Frenzen, the first attorney representing the Iraqis, was
joined on the case by James Woolsey, 20 8 who sought to use his top security
clearance to obtain the classified evidence in order to defend the Iraqis' cases.
The government denied him access on the basis that it did not trust him 2to
20 9 Woolsey took the case to the press 10
keep the information confidential.
and to congressional hearings.21
Reacting to the publicity, the INS released 500 pages of its secret evidence.
The evidence proved what Woolsey had surmised: that serious errors in
Arabic-English translations; ethnic and religious stereotyping prevalent among

206. Virtue Testimony, supra note 4.
207. See David Cole, Terrorist Scare: GuardingAgainst PLO Terrorism andActivism, THE NATION,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 27.
208. James Woolsey is the former Director of the CIA who directed the U.S. government's efforts to
organize and support the Kurds in an attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. He is now a private attorney
in Washington, D.C. See Gage, supra note 160, at 12.
209. See id. at 13.
210. In an article published in the Wall Street Journal, Woolsey stated:
Six Iraqi men are sitting in a Los Angeles prison, bewildered by the U.S. government's decision to
deport them. They are all enemies of Saddam Hussein, and after the Iraqi dictator's attack on
northern Iraq in late 1996 the United States evacuated them and their families to Guam and then to
Southern California. Now the Immigration and Naturalization Service argues that the six are a
threat to U.S. national security, and an immigration judge has agreed that they should be sent back
to Iraq, where they face nearly certain death. Though they struggled for freedom in Iraq, these men
are being deprived of their basic rights to defend themselves ....
James R. Woolsey, Iraqi Dissidents Railroaded by U.S., WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at A18. Woolsey
discussed the seventh Iraqi's case as providing clues to the government's secret evidence:
Why does the INS insist on keeping them in prison facing deportation and death? A case earlier this
year, involving similar charges against another Iraqi evacuee, suggests that Justice Department
incompetence may be a major factor. Hasim Qadir Hawlery was singled out by the INS and
imprisoned for a year after a botched interview by the FBI in Guam. Errors in translation and the
interviewer's ignorance of Iraq led the INS to believe wrongly that Hawlery was lying about
belonging to a particular opposition group. This mistake came to light only because the charges
against Hawlery were unclassified, so the INS evidence had to be presented before both parties in
an open hearing. He won his bid to stay in the US... Similar blunders may lie behind the charges
against the six. Or disinformation may have been sown by informants among the larger group of
Iraqi evacuees on Guam, some of whom may well have borne personal grudges or had other
ulterior motives. Such errors will never come to light without a defense lawyer allowed to
cross-examine government witnesses.
Id.
211.

See supra note 187; infra notes 214, 225 and accompanying text.
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the agents interviewing the Iraqis; 2 12 and inter-group rivalries and rumors
among the Iraqi groups themselves were the basis of the government's
allegations against them.213 Woolsey characterized INS' declassification of
the evidence to Congress:
This summer, congressional and press attention forced the INS to admit
that it had erroneously classified hundreds of pages of hearing transcript
and evidence... the government continues to insist that some remaining material must stay classified and cannot be shown even to counsel
holding clearances .... The government never explained how the
erroneous classification occurred, nor the reason for a nearly twomonth delay between the declassification on May 19 th and their transmission to us on July 1 0 th .... The material that was released this
summer indicates that the FBI agents who interviewed these men and
the other heads of household after their evacuation from Iraq to Guam
were not asked to conduct any investigation of the allegations against
them .... 21
Similar INS misconduct is apparent in both the type of evidence it claimed
to be secret and in the source of its evidence in Hany Kiareldeen's case.
Kiareldeen suspected that his ex-wife, Amal Mohamed, was the source of the
information against him, 21 5 and he sought her testimony in open court. When
summoned, Mohamed refused to testify in immigration court about her
relationship with the FBI and INS. 2 1 6 When the IJ ordered the U.S. Attorney
to obtain a subpoena from a federal judge requiring Mohamed to testify
before him, the U.S. Attorney refused to comply. Disregarding the judge's
order, he merely requested Mohamed's responses to written questions.
Kiareldeen's lawyers themselves then sought subpoenas from the federal
217
court to force Mohamed to testify.
In Mazen Al-Najjar's case, the government at first refused to disclose to
Al-Najjar any evidence concerning its allegations that he was affiliated with a
terrorist organization. Later in the proceedings, the government provided him
with a summary of its classified evidence, which stated only that he was

212. Just one example of the type of stereotyping evident in the notes prepared by the FBI agents
about the Iraqis is the statement by Agent John Cosenza: "There is no guilt in the Arab world. It's only
shame." See Gage, supra note 160, at 13.
213. See id.
214. Woolsey Statement, supra note 187.
215. Mohamed had accused Kiareldeen previously six different times of child abuse and domestic
abuse. See Gage, supra note 160, at 12. None of these charges were substantiated. Id. Kiareldeen also
learned that Mohamed's former husband had been deported based on information she gave to the

government. Id.
216.

The INS indicated that Amal Mohamed received conditional permanent resident status because

she "has provided significant assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ... [and] Amal is in a
position to be of significant help in current as well as future FBI investigations." UPDATE (National
Coalition to Protect Political Freedom, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 20, 1999, at 5.
217. See Gage, supranote 160, at 12.
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associated with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.21 8 In late 1998, over a year
after his initial incarceration, Al-Najjar sought and obtained a visa to Guyana.
He informed the INS of his willingness to depart to Guyana, but the INS,
taking a position it has taken in many of the secret evidence cases, opposed
his request to leave to resettle in a third state. The U.S. government then
pressured Guyana to revoke the visa. 21 9 Al-Najjar remains in jail.
The same pattern of improper classification and use of secret evidence is
apparent in Imad Hamad's case. As the appeal and related proceedings
dragged on, Hamad remarried. He again applied to adjust his status, and the
220
INS opposed his application on the same grounds as it had before.
Nevertheless, the IJ granted him adjustment of status in February 1997,
reviewing the classified evidence and finding it insufficient to sustain the
government's burden, and ordering Hamad's release from detention. The INS
appealed. 22 '
In June 1998, the government declassified much of the evidence, which
did not include any information in addition to the associational activity with
which Hamad had already been confronted with in the 1989 open hearing.2 2 2
The government's secret evidence, which had originally been public, somehow received "classified" status and then was declassified in the same
case. 2 2 3 After more than ten years in deportation proceedings, the BIA
rendered a decision that Hamad is entitled to adjustment of status.
Concerning the INS' "secret evidence," which the BIA reviewed, the
Board said:
[W]e find that the association with the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine is unproven. The evidence presented is vague, lacking in
specificity and uncorroborated ... The status of the PFLP as a terrorist
organization was never in dispute in these proceedings; therefore, the
designation by the Secretary of State does not necessitate reconsideration of the IJ's decision in light of the lack of evidence that the
respondent committed an act of terrorist activity or knowingly afforded
material support of any individual, organization or government in

218. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 131. AI-Najjar, a Gaza native, is a stateless Palestinian. He
applied for suspension of deportation-he has a wife and three U.S. citizen daughters-and for asylum
and withholding. The U denied him asylum and withholding on the basis that he failed to show a
well-founded fear of persecution and ordered him deported to Saudi Arabia. The Judge denied bond on the
basis of the classified evidence, finding that AI-Najjar "is associated with a terrorist organization known as
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad." In re AI-Najjar, A26-599-077 (Fla., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. June 23, 1997)
(mem.) (regarding custody redetermination). No evidence was ever produced to show A1-Najjar himself
engaged in any terrorist, or for that matter, illegal activities.
219. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 132.
220. See id. at 3.
221. See id.
222. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 5, at 133-34. See also In re Imad Salih Hamad,at 3 (Mich.,
EOIR, Immigr. Ct.) (on file with author).
223. See Gage, supra note 160, at 10.
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conducting terrorist
224 activity, including the soliciting of funds or other
things of value."
The rampant anti-Arab, anti-Muslim bias of the agencies involved in these
cases is well-illustrated by Woolsey's words to Congress. With regard to the
cases of the Iraqi Seven, Woolsey testified:
In ex parte testimony, belatedly declassified, more than one [U.S.
government] interrogator expressed clear bias [to the immigration
court]. For example, and I quote, "Arabs lie an awful lot ....[T]here is
no guilt in the Arab world .... " Another drew bold negative conclu-

sions about one of the men on the basis of having misread his own notes
about certain dates. And either INS counsel falsely assured the immigration judge, in this case, that she personally asked the CIA and FBI to
prepare unclassified summaries of evidence, or those organizations
subsequently falsely stated that they had not been so asked. Those are
the only two possibilities.2 25

V.

REVIVING IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AGAINST ARABS AND

MUSLIMS THROUGH CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: ANTITERRORISM
LEGISLATION AND LACK OF JUDICIAL REvIEW

The authority legislatively granted to the INS to use secret evidence in
deportation proceedings is one of several factors which have converged to
grant the agency unprecedented, sweeping powers to exclude and deport
Arabs and Muslims for their beliefs and associations. The factors limiting
any effective checks and balances from Congress and the courts are examined in this section. On Congress' part, there has been a legislative revival of
the doctrine of plenary power through the secret evidence and judicial
review-stripping provisions in AEDPA and IIRRA, illustrating legislative
targeting of Arabs and Muslims. On the part of the Judiciary, both the federal
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have either severely limited or denied
constitutional protections to aliens challenging exclusion on ideological
grounds. Examples from the secret evidence cases themselves best illustrate
the effect of these factors on due process and the constitutional rights of
aliens. The convergence of these factors indicates a complete failure of any
effective checks and balances against rampant abuse of law and procedure
evident in the current secret evidence cases, ensuring the success of the
government's strategies to exclude or deport Arab and Muslim aliens on the
basis of their beliefs and associations.

224.
225.

In re Imad Salih Hamad, at 6 (internal citations omitted).
Woolsey Statement,supra note 187.
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The Revival of IdeologicalExclusion Targeting Arabs and Muslims

While Congress was restricting the broad powers granted the Executive to
deport or exclude aliens based only on their political beliefs, it was also
ensuring that ideological exclusion and deportation continued to apply to
aliens of Arab origin, using the "terrorist" rubric to justify its actions.
Through legislation and a series of cases concerning individuals who
espoused the cause of Palestinian independence and nationhood, the Executive and Congress sought to prevent the entry of aliens of Palestinian origin
and to silence their message.2 26
Under pressure from its European partners to implement its treaty obligations under the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (the Helsinki Accords),22 7 the United States enacted the McGovern

226. The attempts to silence Palestinians from voicing their legitimate viewpoint about their struggle
has a political impetus in that the United States has almost consistently maintained a policy of supporting
only the Israeli perspective. The Palestinian struggle opposes the consequences of Zionist philosophy,
which has driven them from their land. By utilizing the old Ottoman Land Code, many Palestinians in the
late 19th Century were driven from their land, no longer allowed to own or work the fields. See Rashid
Khalidi, Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism Before World War I, in BLAMING THE VICTIMS:
SPURIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION (Edward W. Said & Christopher Hitchens eds.,
1988). Throughout the early part of this century, the Jewish National Fund continued to acquire land in
Palestine, forcing the migration of increasing numbers of Palestinians. See JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND
ISRAEL (1990). By 1948 civil and guerilla warfare erupted, and the Zionists began an organized expulsion
of Arab communities. See BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM (1987). In
the spring of 1948, the State of Israel was established, effectively barring the return of Palestinians to their
native land. Historians generally agree that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced by Zionist
militias and Zionist design to flee their homes and lands and become refugees. The exact numbers of
refugees created in 1948 are disputed, but the most defensible figures are between 700-800,000. See
BENNY MORRIS, supra; LEX TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

13, 18 (Clarendon Press 1998); SALMAN ABU-SrTrA, THE PALESTINIAN NAKBA 1948: THE REGISTER OF
DEPOPULATED LOCALmES IN PALESTINE (1998). Not only were the Palestinian refugees barred from
returning to their homes, but they were also retroactively deprived of their citizenship. See 1952
Nationality Law, 5712/1952, 93 Official Gazette 22 (1952). The UN, in an attempt to alleviate the plight of
Palestinian refugees, formed official UN bodies mandated to serve the daily needs of Palestinians in
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza Strip and Egypt (UNRWA), and the UNCCP was charged with the
conciliation efforts within the new State of Israel. See UNCCP mandate: GA Res. 194(M), UN Doc A/810
(1948). Additionally, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, at art. ID. allowed for a unique international refugee regime under which Palestinians should enjoy
specialized protection. Because of the complex legal interplay of these provisions in connection with the
specific interpretation of the host country, the result is.often that Palestinians are stateless persons without
the rights of citizens, residents, immigrants or refugees of their native or host country. For instance,
Canada, Austria, Switzerland and Australia analyze Palestinian claims as those of regular claimants
without taking into account the special UN provisions for Palestinian refugees. See Immigration Act, ch.
52, § 1 (1976-77) (Can.), Art. 3 Asylgesetz BGBL 8/1992 (Austria), Art. 3, Asylum Law of Switzerland,
Bundesamt fur Fluchtlinge & Schwizerische Zentralstelle fur Fluchtlingshilfe; Migration Act of 1958 of
Australia, § 6A. The 50-year history of massive human rights violations by Israel against Palestinians
within the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in the occupied South of Lebanon and the Golan Heights is
"encyclopedic." RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK (1988). Lebanon, Syria,

Jordan, Egypt and various of the states in the Arabian Gulf have also killed imprisoned, tortured, expelled
and denied basic human and economic rights to the Palestinians residing in their territories. See DAVID
GILMOUR, DISPOSSESSED: THE ORDEAL OF THE PALESTINIANS (1982).

227. Reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Among other provisions, the Helsinki Accords provide:
"The participating states intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional
reasons and to this end in particular: -gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for
exit and entry; -to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States
in their territory, with due regard to security requirements. Id. at1314.
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Amendment 22 8 in 1977. This Amendment permitted the Attorney General to
waive the exclusion of any alien when exclusion was based on affiliation with
an organization the INA designated as "terrorist.", 229 The McGovern Amend-

ment did not completely eliminate ideological bases of exclusion for two
major reasons. First, the waiver only applied to subsection (a)(28), leaving
consular officers free to exclude on the basis of ideology under the provisions
of (a)(27). Second, the waivers were completely discretionary and unlikely 23to0
be approved if the Department of State recommended against approval.
Furthermore, in 1979, Congress made a single exception to the McGovern
Amendment, applicable only to the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO"). The exception stated that the waiver was inapplicable to any
"officials [or] representatives ... of the PLO" 23 t .
Between 1980 and 1986, a number of amendments to the McCarranWalter Act were introduced, but none had sufficient backing to pass Congress. 232 Both Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) and Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) introduced proposals in 1987233 to repeal the
ideological exclusion provisions of McCarran-Walter, but the bills failed in
the face of pressure by conservative republicans in Congress and the Reagan
White House.23 4 Although a version of the Moynihan-Frank proposal passed
as Section 901(a) of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act in 1988, both
non-immigrants and PLO members were excepted from its provisions.2 35
In 1987, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act, mandating the closure
of the Palestine Information Office ("PIO") in Washington, D.C., the official
institution of the PLO in the United States, as well as the PLO Observer

228.
229.

22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1988).
See id., which provides:

[T]he Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a non-immigrant
visa by any alien who is excludable from the United States by reason of membership in or
affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to the United States,
recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa to
such alien, unless the Secretary of State determines that the admission of such alien would be
contrary to the security interests of the United States .... Nothing in this section may be construed
as authorizing or requiring the admission to the United States of any alien who is excludable for
reasons other than membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization.
230. See Gary,supra note 23, at 237.
231. Congress' reason for excluding the PLO from the McGovern Amendment was that its terrorist
activities against Israel endangered the Camp David Accords and failed to comply with the Helsinki
Accords. See Deborah L. Zimic, Note, National Security Visa Denials: Delimiting the Exercise of
Executive Exclusion Authority under the Immigrationand NationalityAct, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 711, 731 n.
99(1988).
232. See Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds:An Update, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 260-61 (1985).
233. See id. at 263.
234. See Alexander Wohl, Free Speech and the Right of Entry into the United States: Legislation to
Remedy the IdeologicalExclusion Provisionsof the Immigration and NaturalizationAct, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L.
L. & POL'Y 443, 474-75 (1989).
235. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
§ 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182) (1987).
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Mission at the United Nations in New York.23 6 The Act made it unlawful for
anyone acting to further the interests of the PLO to receive anything of value
except informational material from the PLO, to expend PLO funds, or to
establish or maintain an office at the direction of the PLO.2 37 The AntiTerrorism Act was immediately challenged, both by the Palestine Information Office itself and by U.S. citizens who claimed the right to hear what the
PLO had to say. In tandem with the Anti-Terrorism Act, the U.S. Department
of Justice
filed a lawsuit to close the PLO's U.N. Observer Mission in New
38
2

York.

The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York heard
both the PLO- Observer Mission and the Mendelsohn cases. In the PLO

ObserverMission case, the court found that the Anti-Terrorism Act could not
contravene the United Nations Headquarters Agreement under which the
PLO Observer Mission was an authorized presence at the UN. 23 9 In Mendelsohn v. Meese, the same federal court upheld the Anti-Terrorism Act, but held
that it did not prohibit the operations of the PIO so long as the PLO itself did

not "supply funds to, or assume control of" the PIO within the United
States.2 40 Nonetheless, the PIO was finally shut down by order of the

Department of State.2 4
At about the same time, President Reagan issued a secret National Security
Decision Directive, creating the National Program for Combating Terrorism.2 42 The Directive authorized the creation of the Alien Border Control
Committee, which was designed to prevent "terrorists" from entering or
remaining in the United States. The Border Control Committee, an interagency task force comprising members of the FBI, CIA and Department of
State, considered a number of different proposals to carry out its mission,
including one to implement a "registry and processing procedure" to keep
information on aliens in the United States. Under this proposal, the CIA, FBI,
and other agencies were to "immediately provide" the INS with "names,
236. See 22 U.S.C. § 5201 (1994). See also George E. Gruen, The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987-An
Update on the Controversy Surrounding Efforts to Close Down PLO Offices in the U.S., II TERRORISM
235, 237-38 (1988) (discussing legislative efforts to remove PLO representatives from the United States).
237. See Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 853 F. 2d. 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695
F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (seeking declaratory judgment that the Act violated First Amendment
rights of free speech and association, and bill of attainder clause of U.S. Constitution).
238. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
239. See id. at 1465. The Headquarters Agreement prohibits the United States from restricting access
of invitees of the UN. It also prohibits the United States from imposing restrictions on the free passage of
UN invitees. See 22 U.S.C. § 287. The Agreement also states: "[Tihe federal, state or local authorities of
the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of... (4)
representatives of nongovernmental organizations recognized by the United Nations ...or (5)other
persons invited to the headquarters district ...on official business." Id.
240. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F.Supp. at 1490.
241. See Determination and Designation of Benefits Concerning Palestine Information Office, 52 Fed.
Reg. 37,035 (1987).
242. President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 207 in 1986, but it only became
public as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request in the LA 8 litigation in 1989. See Eve Pell,
Kicking Out Palestinians,THE NATION, Feb. 5,1990, at 167-68 (discussing the government's efforts to
deport the LA 8 because of their criticism of U.S. policy towards the Middle East).
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nationalities and other identifying data and evidence relating to alien undesirables and suspected terrorists believed to be in... the U.S." 243
Among the plans of the Border Control Committee was an INS-created
2' 44
strategy called "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan.
This thirty-one page memorandum, which only came to light as part of the
LA 8 litigation, suggests use of the McCarran-Walter Act to apprehend and
detain aliens from designated countries-all of them, except Iran, being Arab
countries. 2 4 5 The memo also proposes a strategy of detaining aliens apprehended "as a result of any special projects undertaken by INS" in the large,
newly-constructed INS detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana. It was with
the backdrop of this covert strategy that the INS initiated deportation
proceedings against the LA 8.
Many critics have pointed out that the United States has discriminated
against Arabs in applying the terrorist exclusion provisions of the INA.24 6
Palestinians are the only group ever prosecuted for their activities under the
current provisions of terrorist exclusion laws. 47 During the Gulf War crisis,
government officials fingerprinted and photographed all entrants of Arab
activities or evidence that they
origin-and only Arabs-regardless of 2past
48
actually intended to engage in terrorism.

243. See Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the Comm 'n on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians: Hearingson H.R. 442 before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Govt Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 67 (1987).
244. See BORDER CONTROL COMMIrTEE, INS, ALIEN TERRORISTS AND UNDESIRABLES: A CONTINGENCY
PLAN (1986) [hereinafter INS CONTINGENCY PLAN] (on file with the author). See also BORDER CONTROL
COMMITrEE, INS, BORDER PATROL RESPONSE To AN EN BLOC REGISTRATION OR EN BLoC REVOCATION OF
NIV STATUS OF A CLASS OF ALIENS (on file with author). These plans clearly envision a phased process of
registration, detention, and removal of aliens from specified countries. The first phase contemplates
apprehending 200 to 500 aliens and detaining them in INS holding facilities. See INS CONTINGENCY PLAN,
supra.The second phase contemplates INS detaining between 500 to 1000 aliens in the isolated facility at
Oakdale, Louisiana. See id. The third phase, in the event over 1000 aliens were to be apprehended, would
require detention of aliens in military barracks and in tent facilities on 100 acres of land in Louisiana.
See id.
245. Nationals of the following designated countries were to be rounded up and apprehended:
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Morocco and Lebanon. See INS CONTINGENCY PLAN, supra
note 244, at 16.
246. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 143, at 198-99; David Cole, Secret Tribunal, THE NATION. May 6,
1991, at 581 (criticizing the recent FBI and INS investigations of Palestinian-born resident aliens accused
of affiliating with terrorist organizations); Susan Aschoff, Appeal to Stay in Country Rejected, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at B7 (reporting critics who state that Al-Najjar was a political target);
Susan Aschoff, In Immigration, Even Judges May Not See Evidence, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES Al, Sept. 6,
1999 (reporting activist groups across the country who claim that "[v]irtually every man targeted by secret
evidence is an Arab-American or Muslim. They are victims of racial and religious prejudice stoked by the
country's fear of terrorism").
247. See Cole, supra note 143, at 189-99.
248. See Sharon LaFraniere & George Lardner, U.S. Set to Photograph,Fingerprintall New Iraqiand
Kuwaiti Visitors; Unusual Move Taken to Try to Counter Possible TerroristAttacks, WASH. POST, Jan. I1,
1991, at A23. DOJ ordered all immigrants with Iraqi or Kuwaiti passports to be fingerprinted and
photographed, with the explanation that Iraq had confiscated the documents of Kuwaitis during the Iraqi
invasion. The FBI also interviewed 200 Arab-American business and community leaders under the guise
of uncovering "terrorist" affiliations. Id. For plans to resurrect these procedures, see Fingerprinting of
Nonimmigrants Designated by the Attorney General, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,024 (1993) (proposed Dec. 23,
1993).
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The Oklahoma City bombing, initially attributed to "Middle East terrorists" precipitated the latest wave of terrorism hysteria.2 49 In such a climate, it
was a relatively simple matter for Congress to step up its efforts at "antiterrorist" measures, once again targeting aliens of Middle Eastern origin. In
addition to the anti-Palestinian legislation and court actions reviewed above,
there have been other legislative efforts to constrain Palestinian activity and
speech in the United States. Such bills as the Terrorist Group Hamas Banning
Act of 1993,250 introduced by Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY) and the
Terrorist Interdiction Act of 1993,25 t introduced by Representatives Olympia
Snowe (R-ME) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), sought to revive exclusion
based on association, and focus on Arab groups.

B.

Legislative Resurrectionof Plenary Power: Review-Stripping and
Secret Evidence Provisionsof AEDPA and JIRIRA

The courts' efforts to curb ideological exclusion, and Congress' legislative
repeal of McCarran-Walter, came to an abrupt halt with the passage of
AEDPA and IIRIRA. Not only did these two Acts, passed in the post-Gulf
War and Oklahoma City aftermath, legislatively revive plenary power,
but they also significantly checked the ability of the federal courts to
exert jurisdiction over immigration decisions. The Supreme Court gave
resounding approval to this revival of plenary power in First Amendmentrelated deportation and exclusion decisions in Reno v. AADC, discussed
below.
IRIRA eliminated judicial review of certain imnigration decisions.2 52
Over other immigration decisions, the statutes substantially limit the type
of review, the timing of review, and the forum in which such review can

249. See Emily Bernstein, Islam in Oklahoma: FearAbout Retaliation Among Muslim Groups:
Arab-American Groups Condemn Act, N.Y. TAEs, Apr. 21, 1996, atA26; Walter Goodman, Wary Network
Anchors Battle Dubious Scoops, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at B 12. See also Sugg, supranote 155, at 7.
250. S. 503, 103d Cong. (1993). Section 1 reads: "TERRORISTACTIVITIES Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)) is amended by adding at the end: 'An
alien who is a member, officer, official, representative, or spokesman of Hamas (commonly known as the
Islamic Resistance Movement) is considered, for purposes of this Act, to be engaged in terrorist
activity.' "'Id. § 1.
251. H.R. 2041, 103d Cong. (1993). The bill, among its other features, would require exclusion of
members of any terrorist organization. Id. The INA specifies only one "terrorist organization"-the PLO.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
252. See AEDPA, § 440(a)(10), which states that "any final order of deportation against an alien who
is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered ...shall not be subject to review
by any court.".
253. See URIRA supra note 2, § 306(a)(2) (codified as amended at INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1)) (limitations on judicial review of particular decisions); Lucas Guttentag, The 1996
Immigration act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-StatutoryRestrictions and Constitutional Rights, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 245-60 (1997). Additional restrictions appear in the new summary removal
proceedings, which provide very limited administrative and judicial review. See IIRLRA § 302(b)(1)(c)
(codified as amended at INA § 235(b)(1)(C) (1999)).
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be sought.2 53 Section 242(g) of the INA, enacted by IIRIRA, is particularly significant for the ideological exclusion and secret evidence cases. It
states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate2 5cases,
or
4
execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.",
It is this provision which, more than any other, has resurrected plenary power
over deportable or excludable aliens and which has breathed new life into
ideological exclusion.
C. JudicialResurrectionof PlenaryPower: the Supreme Court and its
Contribution to Ideological Exclusion
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the reach of section 242(g) of the
INA may be the death knell of any meaningful challenge to exclusion or
removal on ideological grounds. In Reno v. AADC, the Supreme Court ruled

that section 242(g) of the INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction over the
claims of aliens and lawful permanent residents that they are being targeted
for selective enforcement of immigration laws based on their associations
and that such aliens do not have a constitutional right to make such claims as
a defense to deportation. The Court's opinion may well close the door to
meaningful review of claims that aliens are being excluded on the basis of
First-Amendment-protected activity, i.e., claims of ideological exclusion.
Reno v. AADC is the most recent chapter in the twelve-year saga of the LA
8. After the McCarran-Walter Act's communist provisions were repealed and
those aspects of the INS charges were dropped, the INS changed its
deportation grounds against the two lawful permanent residents to membership in an organization which advocates unlawful killing of government
officers and unlawful damage or destruction of property.255 It amended its
charges against the other six to routine visa violations. The INS Regional
Counsel stated that the charges were changed for tactical reasons, but the INS
continued to seek the deportation of the eight on the basis of their affiliation
with the PFLP. 2 5 6 The aliens then amended their complaint to charge the INS
with selective enforcement of the immigration laws in violation of the First
and Fifth Amendments.25 7

254.
255.
256.

INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
See AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id.

257. See Supreme Court Speaks on Controversial Constitutional, Judicial Review Issues in Latest
Decision, 76 INTERPRErER RELEASES 365,366 (1999).
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The District Court, which first reviewed the selective prosecution claim,
granted preliminary injunctions against the government's continued deportation proceedings against the six non-immigrants, concluding that they
were likely to prove that the INS singled them out to enforce routine
immigration status violations because of their association with a disfavored
group, the PFLP. 25 8 The court found that the six aliens would be able to prove
a chill to their First Amendment rights. However, the court granted the
government's summary judgment motion against the selective prosecution
claims of the two lawful permanent residents, Hamide and Shehadeh.2 59 The
Ninth Circuit partly reversed and partly upheld the District Court's decision,
finding that all eight would likely prove a selective prosecution claim, and
remanding to the district court to enter an appropriate judgment on the
injunctions.2 6 °
While this litigation was pending, the IIRIRA transitional rules affecting
the right to judicial review of immigration decisions came into effect. The
government filed motions to dismiss the LA 8 case with both the district court
and the court of appeals, claiming that the new section 242(g) of the INA
removed any jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear the issues raised by
the case unless and until a final deportation order was entered. The district
court disagreed, finding that jurisdiction over the LA 8 claims survived
242(g) 26 ' and that decision was also appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit found that 242(g) did not remove federal court jurisdiction over
the claims and upheld the preliminary injunctions on behalf of all plaintiffs.

2 62

The Supreme Court granted the government's petition for writ of certiorari, limiting review to one question: whether, in light of the IIRIRA, the
courts below had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' challenge to the
deportation proceedings prior to the entry of a final order of deportation.26 3
However, instead of confining itself to that question, the Supreme Court ruled
on two separate issues: the scope of judicial review, and the claim of selective
enforcement.

258. AADC v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The entire thrust of the government's case
to deport the LA 8 has been based ab initio on their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), a PLO-splinter organization. The District Court in AADC, 70 F.3d 1045, found that the
PFLP is engaged in a wide range of lawful activities, from providing education, health care, social services
and day care to cultural and political activities. The government has characterized the PFLP as a terrorist
and communist organization, and the Attorney General has listed the PFLP on its terrorist organizations
list. See John Kifner, Roots of Terror: A Special Report-Alms and Arms: Tactics in a Holy War, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at Al. Another Palestinian organization appearing on the Attorney General's list,

Hamas, is described by Israeli security services as devoting 95% of its resources to social services. See id.
259. See AADC, 883 F. Supp. at 1365.
260. See AADC, 70F.3d 1045,1070.
261. See AADC, 883 F. Supp at 1370.
262.
263.

See AADC, 70 F.3d 1045.
See Reno v. AADC, 119 S. Ct. 936, 938 (1999).
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On judicial review, the Court addressed the statutory construction problem
presented by the relationship of sections 309(c)(1) 264 and 306(c)(1) 265 of
IRIRA. Section 309(c)(1) implements transitional rules for judicial review
of cases in exclusion or deportation proceedings on the effective date of
IIRIRA, April 1, 1997. However, under section 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA, one
provision, section 24 2(g), applies to all cases "without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings." '2 6 6 Interpreting this language, the Supreme Court said the
preclusion of review "seemingly governs here, depriving the federal courts
of jurisdiction '[e]xcept as provided in this section.' ,,267 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, dismissed both sides' arguments concerning the
appropriate statutory construction of section 242(g) as strained:
If the jurisdiction-excluding provision of [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(g) [INA
§ 242(g)]. . . "[e]xcept as provided in this section" incorporates (as one
would suppose) all the other jurisdiction-related provisions of § 1252
[INA § 242], then [IIRIRA] § 309(c)(1) would be rendered a virtual
nullity. To say that there is no jurisdiction in pending INS cases "except
as" § 1252 [INA § 242] provides jurisdiction is simply to say that
§ 1252's [INA § 242's] jurisdictional limitations apply to pending cases
as well as future cases-which hardly seems what [IIRIRA] § 309(c)(1)
is about. If, on the other hand, the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this
section" were (somehow) interpreted not to incorporate the other
jurisdictional provisions of § 1252 [INA § 242]-if § 1252(g) [INA
§ 2 4 2 (g)] stood alone, so to speak-judicial review would be foreclosed
for all deportation claims in all pending deportation cases, even after
entry of a final order.26 8

264. See IIRIRA, supra note 2, § 309(c)(1) (codified as amended at INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(19996), which provides transitional rules stating, in pertinent part:
(1) General rule that new rules do not apply. Subject to the succeeding provisions of this
subsection [excepting § 306(c)], in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation
proceedings before the title HI-A effective date
(A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and
(B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without
regard to such amendments.
265. See IIRIRA, supra note 2, § 306(c)(1) (codified as amended at INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(1996), which provides:
[T]he amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to all final orders of deportation or
removal and motions to reopen filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act and subsection
(g) of section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by subsection (a)), shall apply
without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings under such Act.
266.
267.
268.

AADC, 119 S. Ct. at 945.
Id. at 941.
Id.
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Instead of such interpretation-that section 242(g) "covers the universe of
deportation claims-that it is a sort of 'zipper' clause that says 'no judicial
review,' ' 269
review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial
Justice Scalia put forward a novel theory that neither party endorsed. The
Court found that 242(g) is a much more limited provision that applies
exclusively "to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her
'decision or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders.' ,270 The Court then cited a number of different decisions or
actions which the Attorney General may take in the immigration context
27 The Court
which would not be encompassed by the language of 242(g).
concluded that the respondents' challenges were an attack on the Attorney
General's decision to "commence proceedings" against them and thus fell
2 72
within section 242(g) proscription of non-final order judicial review. No
other provision in section 242, according to the Court, provided the federal
2 73
courts with jurisdiction over the LA 8 claims.

Concerning the selective enforcement claims, the Court found that an alien
unlawfully in the United States has no constitutional right to assert selective
74
enforcement as a defense to deportation.2 Thus, the government does not
violate the Constitution by deporting an alien for the additional reason that it
believes the alien is a member of an organization supporting terrorist activity.
The Court stated that aliens often challenge deportation proceedings solely to
postpone deportation "in the hope that the alien's status will change-by, for
example, marriage to an American citizen" or to extend an unlawful period of
stay.2 75 In the Court's perspective, selective enforcement suits are obstacles
to justified deportation, and "could leave the INS hard pressed to enforce
routine status requirements., 276 Moreover, concerning the foreign policy
implications of selective enforcement actions, the Court said:
[T]he Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for
deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat-or indeed
for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by
focusing on that country's nationals-and even if it did disclose them a
their authenticity and utterly
court would be ill equipped to determine
2 77
unable to assess their adequacy.

269. Id. at 943.
270. Id. (emphasis in original).
271. The Court's examples included the decision to open an investigation, to conduct surveillance
against an alien, to reschedule deportation hearings, to include provisions in the final order which are
adjudicated as part of that order, and to refuse to reconsider such an order. See id.
272. See id. at 945.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 947.
277. Id.
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The implications of this decision for ideological exclusion of Arabs and
Muslims are clear: the Supreme Court has announced the death knell of full
and fair judicial review of the constitutional claims aliens might bring to
challenge deportation or exclusion on speech and association grounds. Never
mind that the Court's interpretation of access to judicial review after section
242(g) of IIRIRA is not shared by any immigration scholars or experts. Never
mind that the Court's decision on the LA 8 selective enforcement claim
addressed an issue that was neither accepted in the petition for certiorari, nor
briefed by the parties, nor argued before the Court. The Court's disposition
towards the constitutional claims of aliens, at least those grounded on speech
and association rights, drives the last stake in the heart of the civil liberties of
Arabs and Muslims in the deportation context.
D. Minimal Review from the Lower FederalCourts: The Pernicious
Interpretationsof FISA, Review-Stripping and Detention Provisions
in the Secret Evidence Cases
Any promise that the federal courts will act as a check on the worst abuses
of the administrative and legislative branches of government in the ideological exclusion/secret evidence cases is a hollow one. From current determinations on the legality of electronic or other surveillance in immigrant and alien
cases to decisions on the use of secret evidence in the underlying deportation
or detention proceedings, the federal courts appear to be willing participants
in the government's efforts to silence unpopular Arab or Muslim causes.
In at least some of the secret evidence cases, the government has used the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") 278 to authorize ongoing
surveillance of the immigrants and aliens it has targeted, and then classified
the FISA material and used it as the secret evidence to support deportation or
custody. FISA was passed as a check on the executive branch's actions in
conducting warrantless surveillance under the claim of national security
concerns.
FISA instituted specific substantive and procedural "safeguards" on the
use of warrantless surveillance for national security. Central to the safeguards
was the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("the FISA
Court"), 279 empowered to review applications made by the government to
conduct electronic surveillance of a foreign power or its agents in exparte, in
camera proceedings.2 80
Through a combination of government tactics, the mandate of the FISA
court, and federal court interpretations of the FISA law, the FISA safeguards
which were intended to balance individual rights against the government's
278. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511,92 Stat. 1783.
279. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (authorizing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to appoint seven
federal district court judges to the FISA Court).
280. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(3).
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claims of national security have been essentially eviscerated. First, the
powers of the FISA Court have slowly expanded since its establishment.
Critics call the court a 'rubber stamp' for the Attorney General. 281 Since its
inception in 1978, the court has approved all but one of the 7539 government
applications to conduct electronic surveillance.2 82
Second, the lower federal courts have never ruled against the government
in FISA challenges on constitutional grounds. The government's use of FISA
to authorize a broad range of warrantless surveillance has survived equal
protection, 283 political question, 284 and separation of powers 28 5 challenges
under the Constitution. Of all the FISA decisions, the federal court decisions
in the challenges to electronic surveillance in the LA 8 litigation have most
seriously corroded the individual rights safeguards in the FISA law.
The LA 8 FISA litigation began with a motion in the immigration court
proceedings, in which six of the aliens requested that the government affirm
or deny the existence of electronic surveillance against them and their
attorneys. 21186The government responded by submitting a declaration, known
as the Lindemann Declaration, admitting that the FBI had listened to
conversations of five of the six plaintiffs as well as their attorneys 287 through
"electronic surveillance authorized by the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.", 288 The government then petitioned, ex parte, the
District Court for the Central District of California for an order finding the
surveillance legal and ordering that no information about it would be
disclosed. 289 After ex parte, in camera review, Chief Judge Real of the
District Court found that the electronic surveillance was legally obtained and
that no part of the surveillance or the applications for the surveillance should
be disclosed to the respondents. 290 All eight aliens then filed a civil suit in the
D.C. District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as

281.

See John Colangelo, The Secret FISA Court: Rubber Stamping on Rights, 53 COVERT ACTION 43

(1995); Larry Tell, The Cloak-and-DaggerCourt, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1981, at 63; Leslie Maitland, A
Closed Court's One Issue Caseload, N.Y. TtMEs, Oct. 14, 1982, at B16; Jonathan Turley, Black-Bag
Justice, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 28.
282. See 1979-1993 AT-r'v GEN. ANN. REPORTS PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. §1807 (obtained by the

American Federation of Scientists through FOIA requests), cited in Colangelo, supranote 281, at 49.
283. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1984).
284. See id. at 74.
285. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987).
286. See United States v. Harnide, 914 F.2d 1147 (9th Cit. 1990) (stating that the motion was made by
Hamide, Shehadeh, Amer, Mungai, Amjad Obeid, and Ayman Obeid).
287. See Government's Exhibit 1 at 3-4 [hereinafter Lindemann Declaration], ACLU v. Thornburgh
(D.D.C. June 26, 1989) (C.A. No. 89-2248) ("[Wlhile attorneys of record in this case have been
overheard, only a single conversation was in connection with this case, and that single conversation did
not involve attorney-client communication and was not otherwise privileged."). Further, the Lindemann
Declaration stated: "[N]either logs nor audio tapes of any conversations have been made available to
[Lindemann] or to other attorneys in the Office of Immigration Litigation ...and no use of any of these
surveillances will be made in these proceedings." See id. at 3.
288. Id.
289. See Petition of the United States for Judicial Determination of Legality of Certain Electronic
Surveillance, Joint Appendix at 46,ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cit. 1991) (No. 90-526 1).
290. See Hamide, 914 F2d at 1149-50.
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compensatory and other damages, based on the alleged past and ongoing
surveillance by the government.2 9 t Plaintiffs made both statutory and constitutional claims, arguing that the government surveillance was "part of a
pattern and practice of seeking to use the immigration and other laws against
Palestinians who advocate for Palestinian rights ...
[and was] based solely
' 292
upon plaintiffs' beliefs, statements and associations.
Both sets of claims concerning the surveillance were finally decided by the
Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit refused to
review Judge Real's order in the District Court, finding that since the
government had stated it would not use the FISA evidence in any future
deportation proceedings, there was no statutory violation of FISA and,
therefore, no issue for review. 29 3 The D.C. Circuit's decision found that FISA
provides no private cause of action for enjoining ongoing government
surveillance. 94 It found, however, that there might be constitutional claims
under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, but in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, it required the plaintiffs to show the government acted
with no legitimate purpose and, for the First Amendment, claim that it acted
with the intent of disrupting lawful First Amendment activities.2 95 The court
stated that the plaintiffs would not be allowed to use discovery to meet their
burden.296
In the context of the secrecy with which the government is permitted to
obtain authorization for surveillance and the lack of any opportunity for
individuals to challenge ongoing surveillance, the Barr decision essentially
eliminates any meaningful challenge to the use of FISA-obtained evidence.
As one commentator suggests, the Barr decision turns the entire scheme of
FISA-balancing individual rights against government security needs-on
its head.29 7

The effects of the Barrcourts' interpretation of FISA can be chillingly seen
in the Haddam case. Early in the immigration court proceedings, counsel for
291. See ACLU v. Thornburgh, C.A. No. 89-2248 (D.D.C. June 26, 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub noma.
ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
292. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Relief in the Nature of
Mandamus T 48, ACLU v. Thornburgh (D.D.C. June 26, 1989) (C.A. No. 89-2248). Besides the
admissions in the Lindemann Declaration, plaintiffs relied on the testimony of William Webster, former
FBI Director, at congressional hearings, in which he stated the LA 8 "were arrested because they are
alleged to be members of a world-wide Communist organization which under the McCarran Act makes
them eligible for deportation ...[and they] had not been found to have engaged themselves in terrorist
activity ....[H]ad they been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest." Id.
47.
293. See Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1147 ("If the surveillance is not used, then its legality will not be
relevant to an appeal of a final deportation order, and review by this court will not be available from the
deportation order.").
294. See Barr,952 F.2d at 471-72.
295. Id.
296. See id.
297. See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence
SurveillanceAct of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1380, 1416-17 ("The D.C. Circuit's standard conflicts
with the intent of Congress and undercuts FISA's ability to protect United States persons from
governmental interference with constitutionally protected political dissent.").
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the INS filed a Notice of Intent to Use Classified Evidence under FISA ex
parte, in camera.29 8 Some time later, the INS moved to file a classified
declaration for in camera, ex parte review. The essence of the government's
motion was that it had the results of the surveillance of Haddam's telephone
line and did not wish to reveal the contents of the phone conversations
because neither the information nor a summary of the substance could be
revealed without compromising the information and its sources. 299 Haddam
immediately objected on several grounds. First, he knew that the substance of
the evidence was his own telephone conversations, and the government had
no justification for protecting Haddam's own identity as a source.30 ° Second,
he filed a motion to discover the classified evidence, alleging that it was
exculpatory and that, therefore, he was constitutionally entitled to its production. 30 ' Third, the government did not make even a primafacie showing that
revealing the information would 'damage the national security of the United
States,' the requirement for classifying information under Executive Order
12958.302

Haddam moved to discover the FISA material under the authority of
immigration regulations, 8 CFR § 236.3(c)(4) and 8 CFR § 236.3(c)(3),
seeking to have the tapes of his telephone conversation produced in their
entirety.3° 3 The IJ refused to hear the discovery motion or the exculpatory
evidence arguments, claiming that any challenge to FISA authorized evidence must be made in federal court.
Haddam, however, was not challenging the legality of the electronic
surveillance itself which, under FISA, would have required sole review in
federal district court under 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e). 30 4 Although the government
argued throughout that he should have filed a Motion to Suppress in Federal
District Court because the immigration court had no jurisdiction to hear such

298. See Appellant's Brief at Attachment 1, Haddam BIA Appeal, supranote 172.
299. See Transcript of Immigration Court Proceedings at 101, 567 [hereinafter Haddam Transcript],
Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178.
300. Id. at 563-64.
301. Id. at 563-64.
302. Under Executive Order 12,958 §§ 1.2(a)-(b), 3 C.F.R., 1995 Comp. p. 332, information may only
be classified if its disclosure would damage national security. If there is any significant doubt about
whether national security would be affected, the information must not be classified. See id. The INS
indicated that the classified material was a summary of Haddam's telephone conversations, and that the
classified information related to the government agents who taped the conversations. Haddam argued that
the government had no interest in classifying his own identity. As to the identity of the agents themselves,
Haddam indicated he had no interest in learning their identities, and their identities did not need to be
revealed to produce the taped conversations. If the government was seeking to protect the identities of the
individuals with which Haddam held the conversations, it made no showing at all of why disclosure of
Haddam's, not the government's, contacts would jeopardize the security of the United States. See
Government Motion to File a Classified Declaration, in Haddam Transcript, supra note 299, at 588-89;
Opposition to Government's Request to Use Classified Evidence Ex Parte, In Camera [hereinafter
Opposition to Gov't Request] , in Haddam Transcript, supra note 299, at 588-89.
303. See Opposition to Gov't Request, supra note 302, at 588-89.
304. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) (providing that the federal district court has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether: "(1) the information was lawfully acquired; or (2) the surveillance was not made in
conformity with an order of authorization of approval").
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motions, it actually deprived Haddam of that opportunity, because it only
filed the required Attorney General affidavit long after conclusion of the
immigration hearing.3 °5
The use by the government of a summary of Haddam's telephone conversations was thus fraught with prejudice and subject to no meaningful review
whatsoever. First, the phone conversations were in Arabic. It is unknown
who translated them. If, under the government strategy, only a summary of
the telephone conversations would be offered, then full and accurate translation required under 8 CFR § 3.33 was not going to be available. The
credentials of the translator (and whether he fully understood North African
Arabic, as opposed to Levantine, Egyptian, or one of the other Arabic
dialects) were not made available to anyone. Second, the government
proffered an FBI agent to discuss the contents of the conversations with the IJ
in summary form. 30 6 It is unknown whether the FBI agent's summary was
based on first-hand knowledge, whether the agent was one of the officers
actually hearing the conversation, or what connection the agent had to the
information. Coupled with the large number of other mistranslations, incomplete translations, and uncertified translations which the INS proffered in this
case, the dangers of offering this FBI summary in this form was manifest.30 7
The Government's entire handling of the use of the FISA evidence violated
the FISA provisions, because it filed its Petition for Judicial Determination of
the Legality of Certain Electronic Surveillances months after the immigration proceedings in Haddam's case were concluded. Furthermore, it proceeded on an ex parte motion, without notice to counsel, giving counsel no
opportunity to address the manner of obtaining and using the classified
information. Finally, the government never even served the requisite Affidavit from the Attorney General under FISA on counsel, showing how release
of the information would impinge on national security interests.
The IJ agreed with the government's argument, ruling that Haddam could
only raise his arguments on the exculpatory nature of the evidence in Federal
District Court, and thus never ruled on his motion to suppress based on the
legality of the use of classified evidence. 30 8 As Haddam's case illustrates,
305. See Affidavit and Claim of Privilege of the Attorney General of the United States (filed on or
after May 28, 1997), In re Anwar Haddam. The Affidavit of the Attorney General was notarized on May
28, 1997. The date of the last hearing on Haddam's immigration case was April 9, 1997. Counsel Malea
Kiblan was only served with the Affidavit from the Attorney General when she received the Order
Regarding United States' Petition for Judicial Determination of the Legality of Certain Electronic
Surveillances (signed by the District Court Judge on June 9, 1997).
306. This is, presumably, the manner in which this evidence has now been heard by I Churchill, and
relied on in her decision of May 12, 1999. See Haddam Immigr Ct. II, supra note 184. See also supra
notes 178, 189-90.
307. See infra notes 299-306 and accompanying text.
308. Haddam was clearly entitled to raise any motion to discover, obtain, or suppress classified
evidence in the Immigration Court. See FISA, supranote 278, § 106(c) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)).
Section 106(c) clearly contemplates that classified evidence may be offered in "any trial, hearing, or other
proceedings in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States ....
Id. Section 106(e) states that motions to suppress may be made in proceedings in
which classified evidence has been offered "in any trial, hearing, or other proceedings in or before any
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neither the immigration courts nor the federal district courts are apt to
provide any serious review of evidence which the government improperly
obtains, but claims is properly classified and authorized for use under FISA
against an alien in deportation proceedings.
Neither are the courts indicating any willingness to check the constitutionality of the use of secret evidence in these cases, at least not in response to the
habeas corpus proceedings which the aliens have filed to obtain minimal
review of their long-term continued detention. 30 9 The negative results in the
federal courts appear to be based on a combination of the Reno v. AADC
decision, the interpretation of the standard of review over immigration
decisions to detain, and a reluctance to hear the secret evidence issues
themselves.
The first federal court decision in the secret evidence cases to be issued
following the Supreme Court's opinion in Reno v. AADC was Judge T.S.
Ellis' from the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in
Haddam's second petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention
and the use of secret evidence on both statutory and constitutional grounds. 3t °
Judge Ellis' Memorandum Opinion framed the jurisdictional question, and
answered it in Haddam's case, as:
Whether the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) allow an excludable alien in the midst of an ongoing
exclusion proceeding to obtain district court review of i) the INS's
decision to incarcerate the alien indefinitely and deny release on any
conditions and ii) the INS's ex parte use of secret evidence against the
alien in the exclusion proceedings.
For the reasons set forth here, review of petitioner's claims regarding
the INS's use of exparte secret evidence must be sought in the court of
court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States ...."Id. at
§ 106(e), 50 U.S.C. 1806(e). Section 106(t) states that "whenever any motion or request is made by an
aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States ... to discover, obtain, or
suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance under this Act ... "Id.
at § 106(f), 50 U.S.C. 1806(f). Under these provisions, the IJwas fully authorized to hear and decide any
motion concerning the use of the classified evidence filed by Haddam, whether such motion was to
suppress, discover, or obtain the information.
309. AEDPA has strengthened the immigration decisions authorizing enormous discretionary authority to the INS to detain and continue detention of aliens for long periods of time. Under § 401(a) of
AEDPA, once an alien has been ordered deported, the Attorney General may send the alien to any country
willing to accept him, whether or not that country is likely to persecute or kill the alien. See 8 INA
§ 507(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. 111996). The Attorney General need only make a
finding that it is appropriate to send such an alien to that country in view of the U.S. foreign policy
interests. See id. At the same time, if the U.S. government is unable to find a country willing to accept such
an alien, the Attorney General "may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, retain the alien in
custody." INA § 507(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C). In such circumstances, the INS has authority to
release the alien "solely at the discretion of the Attorney General." Id. It is too early to tell whether Judge
Walls' approach in Kiaraldeen or Judge Elliss' approach in Haddam will ultimately prevail once the
federal courts are fully able to review the constitutional issues in these cases.
310. The second petition for writ of habeas corpus had 14 counts, including claims for temporary and
permanent injunctions against Haddam's continued detention; the use of secret evidence to exclude,
deport and detain him; interference with his right and access to counsel; and the denial of bond and release.
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appeals after the issuance of a final order in the administrative process,
but under IIRIRA's transitional regime, habeas corpus jurisdiction
exists in district court to review petitioner's detention-related claims. 31
Judge Ellis examined the question of whether the federal court had
jurisdiction to review the legality of Haddam's detention under the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 242(g) of the INA. He found that since
"neither the decision to detain nor the decision to use secret evidence falls
within the provision's literal language," they did not fall within one of the
"three discrete actions" of the Attorney General under section 242(g).31 2 He
also found that habeas corpus jurisdiction survived AEDPA's repeal of
District
former section 106(a)(10) of the INA, thus resolving for the Eastern
3 13
courts.
federal
the
among
dispute
thorny
a
of Virginia, at least,
His analysis of whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to review the
use of secret evidence prior to a final order of deportation or exclusion, was,
however, quite different. Setting aside counsel's arguments that there would
be no meaningful review whatsoever of the use of secret evidence unless there
was immediate review available as soon as the threat to First Amendment
rights was implicated, Judge Ellis found that "because a challenge to the use
of secret evidence is essentially a challenge to the anticipated final order...
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
it follows that the 3challenge
14
courts of appeals."
In refusing to review the use of secret evidence in the habeas proceedings,
Judge Ellis furthered the trend set in motion by the Supreme Court towards
curtailing any meaningful challenge to deportation or exclusion based on
First Amendment-protected rights of speech and association. This trend is
important in protecting the government's ability to exclude on the basis of
ideology and association and in ensuring there will be no review of that

ability by the federal courts. This is particularly troublesome in the context of
long-term continued detention of aliens being held on the strength of
undisclosed evidence, as Judge Ellis' final decision in Haddam's habeas
corpus action indicates.

311.

Reno v. AADC, 1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.) [hereinafter Ellis Mem. Op.] (on file with

author).
312. Id.
313. See Ellis Mem. Op., supra note 311, at 16. The debate in the circuit courts has been over the
continued existence of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus jurisdiction after the enactment of IIRIRA. The
debate has focused largely on the interpretation of § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9), which suggest that
jurisdiction has been severely limited or even eliminated. See AADC v. Reno, 199 S. Ct. at 942 n. 7
(discussing the disagreement in interpretation among the courts of appeal). See also Magana-Pizano v.
INS, 152 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1137 (1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 122
(1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999) ("As new INA § 242 is only applicable for aliens
subject to IIRIRA's 'permanent rules,' and as INA § 242(g) is applicable immediately, aliens subject to the
transitional rules ... could not obtain any judicial review because they cannot take advantage of 'this
section,' i.e. new INA § 242.").
314. Ellis Mem. Op., supra note 311, at 18.
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Judge Ellis issued his Final Order in the Haddam habeas on June 23, 1999,
eight months after the petition itself was filed and following at least four
separate oral arguments on the matter. His interpretation of the standard of
review of the federal courts over INS district director decisions to detain was
so deferential as to make any review of such decisions essentially unavailable.3 15 Even though the Judge acknowledged that Haddam responded to,
and refuted the legitimacy of, every reason proffered by the District Director
justifying his detention, he applied a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reasons" or "abuse of discretion" standard,31 6 and found that the District
Director's decision not to parole Haddam must be upheld.3 17
Judge Ellis' decision is a triumph for the application of the aspect of
plenary power that gives enormous deference to the INS' immigration
decisions, and renders them virtually immune to federal court review. Judge
Ellis' decision means that the government can give completely false reasons
for its decision to detain, can give no legitimate reason to detain, or can give
absolutely no reason at all. If Judge Ellis' decision is an indication of how the
federal courts will review such decisions, it appears that the aliens detained
with the justification of secret evidence cannot look to the federal courts for
any relief.
The INS' proffer of classified evidence in this case seems no more than a
thinly-disguised attempt to characterize Haddam's phone conversations in
whatever inappropriate and negative way the Service chooses. The Service
proposed that the evidence concerning the substance of Haddam's conversations be received, not only ex parte and in camera, but in summary form and
from an unsworn, unidentified FBI agent. This is, for all anyone knows, the
manner in which Judge Churchill received the secret evidence. Presumably,
the Service has offered summaries of the Arabic and possibly French
conversations between Haddam and his acquaintances. Haddam had already
objected to the FBI translations of documents submitted by the government
as materially mistranslated. Such evidence does not have the indicia of
reliability guaranteed under our adversarial system, given the highly suspect
nature of the form in which the government has offered it.
From the commencement of Haddam's court proceedings, several of the
judges on the case have been troubled by the use of secret evidence. IJ Bryant
315. The detention statute at issue is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which permits the Attorney General to
exercise discretion over detention decisions on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit. In Haddam's case, Judge Ellis indicated that the District Director's reasons for
detention were "not clear," that the government had "back pedaled" from its original reasons, and that
"the representations from counsel for the federal defendants, including the District Director, have
suggested that the reason for the continued detention of Haddam is not, and possibly never was, either of
the two reasons cited at the earlier hearing. Ellis Mem. Op., supra note 311, at 23-24 n.68. The Haddam
case illustrates that long-term detentionis faced by all aliens while their claims are pending.
316. See Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609-10 n.22-24 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that there
appears to be no practical difference between the two deferential review standards and citing Marczak v.
Greene, 971 F.2d 510,515 (10th Cir. 1992), Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 1982), and Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
317. Id. at611.
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declined to rely on ex parte, in camera testimony of an FBI agent regarding
confidential information gathered by the U.S. government about Haddam. 3 8
The Judge determined that since an unclassified summary could not be made
available to the applicant, "fairness demand[ed] that the Court only rely on
the record to reach its decision.", 3 19 Judge Ellis, in his first Memorandum and
Order, stated, "The use of secret evidence against a party, evidence that is
given to, and relied on, by the IJ and BIA but kept entirely concealed from the
party and the party's counsel, is an obnoxious practice, so unfair that in any
ordinary litigation context, its unconstitutionality is manifest .... 3 2 0
VI.

SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONALIZED BIAS
AGAINST ARABS AND MUSLIMS

One can theorize about the sources and reasons for the apparent institutionalized bias against Arabs and Muslims that is playing out in these cases. One
of the most powerful theories for which there is mounting evidence is that
there are foreign policy interests that are guiding the government's efforts to
discourage Muslims and Arabs from coming to the United States, and to step
up deportations among those communities. According to observers of this
phenomenon, some influential individuals are successfully persuading U.S.
government decision-makers of a new peril: a worldwide Islamic conspiracy
to bring down the West. The FBI and INS appear to be integral players in the
government's strategies of acceptance that such a phenomenon exists.
Columbia University Professor and noted author on Middle East issues
Edward Said has named some of the individuals who are propounding the
"Islamic conspiracy" theory and discussed the legitimacy of their claims:
Never mind that most Islamic countries today are too poverty-stricken,
tyrannical and hopelessly inept militarily as well as scientifically to be
much of a threat to anyone except their own citizens; and never mind
that the most powerful of them-like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and
Pakistan-are totally within the U.S. orbit. What matters to "experts"
like Miller, Samuel Huntington, Martin Kramer, Bernard Lewis, Daniel
Pipes, Steven Emerson and Barry Rubin, plus a whole battery of Israeli
academics, is to make sure that the "threat" is kept before our eyes, the
better to excoriate Islam for terror, despotism and violence, while
assuring themselves profitable consultancies, frequent TV appearances
and book contracts. The Islamic threat is made to seem disproportionately fearsome, lending support to the thesis (which is an interesting
parallel to anti-Semitic paranoia) that there is a worldwide conspiracy
behind every explosion ....
318.
319.
320.
321.

32

Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178, at 22.
Id.
Ellis Mem. Op., supra note 311, at 17.
Edward Said, A Devil Theory of Islam, THE NATION, Aug. 12, 1996, at 28; see also AHMED

YOUSEF & CAROLINE F. KEEBLE, THE AGENT: THE TrH

BEHIND THE ANTI-MUSLIM CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA

1999]

TALES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION

A number of the secret evidence cases provide evidence that foreign policy
interests are driving the efforts of the INS to either remove the individuals
from the United States or to use deportation or removal proceedings to keep
the individuals in custody for long periods of time. One of the most graphic
examples is the A-Najjar case. The government's main contention was that
Al-Najjar was a member of Islamic Jihad. There was no suggestion that he
had committed any illegal activity on behalf of Islamic Jihad. However, the
apparent impetus for initiating deportation proceedings against Al-Najjar was
the investigation against World and Islam Studies Enterprise ("WISE") by
323
the FBI, 322 apparently prompted by Israeli interests.
Anwar Haddam's case reflects equally disturbing evidence that his deportation and lengthy incarceration are motivated by the Algerian government
itself. Among the many irrelevant and tangentially related documents the INS
proffered on the record in the deportation proceedings was a complaint in a
civil action filed against Anwar Haddam.32 4 The action, filed by anonymous
plaintiffs whose identity has to this date not been revealed, allege Haddam's
responsibility for numerous violent acts taking place in Algeria long after
Haddam had fled that country for his life. Neither the complaint, nor any
subsequent evidence filed in the civil action, indicates that there is any
credible proof of a connection between the alleged acts and Anwar Haddam.

(1999). For example, the House passed a bill to create a National Commission on Terrorism, which will
consist of a 15-member panel of "experts" to examine national counterterrorism policies and recommend
ways the U.S. government can be more efficient in protecting Americans. See H.R. 4536, 105th Cong.
(1998). Daniel Pipes has been named to the House of Representatives' proposed National Commission on
Terrorism. See YOUSEF & KEEBLE, supra. In a number of the secret evidence cases, the instigation for the
FBI to investigate the individuals seems to have been prompted by Israeli agents or in response to other
foreign government pressures. See supra parts IV(B)(2), (6) (discussing the cases of Mazen Al-Najjar and
Anwar Haddam).
322. Investigative reporter John Sugg describes in great detail the attack on WISE and the motivation
for the FBI investigation of the institute. See Sugg, supra note 155. According to an affidavit filed by INS
agent Bill West, the federal government launched the investigation of WISE and USF based on a series of
articles published in the TAMPA TRIBUNE in May 1995 called Ties to Terrorists.See id. at 3. In this series,
the TRIBUNE alleged that WISE was a command post for Islamic Jihad. See id. at 3-5. Two journalists who
left the Tribune have stated that Ties to Terrorists was written on the urging of Israeli consulate officials
from Miami, who visited the newspaper "every six months." See id. at 3. A consular official told TAMPA
TRIBUNE editorialists and editors that Israel intended to silence the Middle East Committee at USE Id.
(interviewing Andrea Brunais, former TRUNE columnist and editorial board member). Brunais reported
that an Israeli consular official described details of the series lies to Terroristsin a visit to the Tallahassee
Democrat, where Brunais then worked, months before the series was published. Brunais asked: "How in
the world could he have known that if they [Israeli officials] weren't feeding [Tribune reporter] Fechter the
information?" See id. at 4.
323. One of the main "sources" of information concerning Islamic Jihad and its supposed U.S.
connection which TAMPA TRIBUNE reporter Michael Fechter relied on was a television program aired by
PBS in November, 1994 called "Jihad in America," produced by Steven Emerson, a close friend of
Fechter. See id. at 3. According to the St. Petersburg Times: "Emerson, who has spent two years trying to
prove the existence of an American network of Islamic terrorists after the World Trade Center bombing,
offered no proof of ICP's [Islamic Committee for Palestine, in Tampa] links to Islamic Jihad other than
'knowledgeable sources' and the presence of some militant Islamist speakers at ICP American conferences. James Harper, Freedom of Speech with StringsAttached: A ProvocativeSet of Charges at USF, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 2, 1995, atiD, quoted in Sugg, supra note 155, at 3.
324. See Complaint for Crimes Against Humanity, Doe vs. FIS and Anwar Haddam, (filed December,
1996), submitted as Government exhibit 13, Haddam Immigr Ct. 1,supra note 178.
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More than two years since that complaint was filed, the plaintiffs remain
anonymous except for a single organizational plaintiff which Anwar Haddam
maintains is a group affiliated with the Algerian military junta.32 5
The civil lawsuit appears to be having an inordinate influence on the
actions of the INS and the immigration court. On remand from the BIA, IJ
Bryant reiterated his disapproval of the use of secret evidence, and the INS
moved to recuse him, claiming "extrajudicial bias." Judge Bryant did recuse
himself.326 The case was transferred to IJ Churchill, who heard the secret
evidence in camera and ex parte. In addition, Judge Churchill-over Haddam's protests that she was acting beyond the limited scope of the remand
order-re-opened the record, heard testimony and accepted additional nonclassified evidence, requested both sides to "correct" the transcript from the
pre-appeal hearings, and admitted evidence about the civil lawsuit which was
not moved into the record by either side.327 IJ Churchill denied withholding
of removal and asylum, claiming to base her decision on the open recordwhich had already been reviewed and decided favorably for Haddam by the
BIA-but stating that the "secret evidence ... is relevant, and provides
additional support and weight" to the findings.32 8
Moreover, the INS appears to be relying on information proffered by "experts"
who are not qualified as experts on the particular country conditions in the
individual case, but are experts on "Islamic terrorism," or "Green Peril"
theories. In Haddam's case, the government offered three main "experts":
Patrick Clawson, Daniel Pipes, and Khalid Duran.3 29 In its submission to
support qualifying these experts, the INS offered no evidence whatsoever
concerning their qualifications: no curricula vitae, no offer of proof of the
325. See id. The plaintiffs are represented by Rhonda Copelon and Catherine Albisa of the
International Women's Human Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School; Jennifer Green and Beth Stephens of
the Center for Constitutional Rights; and Michael Maggio of the law firm of Maggio & Kattar in
Washington, D.C.
326. See U Bryant Decision to Recuse, Oct. 2, 1998 (on file with author); see also Haddam Immigr
Ct. II, supra note 184, at 4.
327. IJ Churchill admitted what she termed a "friend of the court brief," which was a letter by the
attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Doe v. FIS civil action re-stating the allegations they made in the civil
complaint and suggesting how U Churchill should analyze Haddam's asylum case. (On file with author).
Attached to the letter was a copy of the amended civil complaint and the District Court Judge's order
denying Haddam's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Neither Haddam nor the INS had solicited the "friend of
the court" brief, and neither had moved it into evidence. It remains unknown to Haddam's counsel how the
attorneys in the civil action learned about the status of Haddam's case or about the dates of his hearing, as
the entire proceedings at that time were highly confidential. Just recently, INS District Counsel Deborah
Todd implied to Haddam's counsel that "three additional non-FBI witnesses may have testified against
Anwar Haddam ex parte, in camera before U Churchill." Conversation of Haddam's co-counsel Malea
Kiblan with Deborah Todd. Their identities, the source, substance or veracity of their testimony remains
unknown to Haddam or his counsel.
328. Haddam Immigr. Ct. II, supranote 184, at 24.
329. One of the most interesting aspects of these cases is the government's choice of "expert
witnesses." A number of individuals appear in various capacities to be providing information or expertise
in these cases, such as Steven Emerson, whose writings and documentary prodded the FBI to investigate
the World Islamic Studies Institute, which investigation initiated the proceedings against Mazen AI-Najjar.
Others, such as Daniel Pipes, Patrick Clawson and Khalid Duran were offered as "experts" in Haddam's
case. A closer look at these individuals "qualifications" indicates that they are anti-Muslim and anti-Arab.
A review of their testimony in view of their proffered qualifications compels this conclusion.
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credentials of either Clawson or Pipes concerning their education, training,
background, publications, prior testimony, etc. Nothing was submitted to
show that either had any expertise whatsoever on Algeria.
Daniel Pipes, for example, did not indicate in his credentials that he had
any expertise on Algeria whatsoever. His statements reflected an extreme
anti-Muslim bias. He made many press statements that confirm his bias, both
against Islamic movements, and against Anwar Haddam personally. Among
his press statements are: "Our whole policy towards Algeria, one of the key
battlegrounds between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Islam, is
riding on [Haddam's] case" ;330 " [T]he notion of good and bad fundamentalists simply has no basis in fact .... [E]very one of them is inherently
extremist .... [F]undamentalist Islam is a narrow, aggressive twentieth-

century ideological movement. Whatever one chooses to call the phenomenon-extremist Islam, fundamentalist Islam, militant.Islam, political Islam,
radical Islam, Islamism, Islamic revival-it is the problem .... ;331 ""[The
West is] under attack ....

People need to understand that [the bombing in

Oklahoma City of the federal building] is just the beginning. The fundamentalists are on the upsurge, and they make it3 3very
clear that they are targeting
2
us. They are absolutely obsessed with us.",
Critics have pointed out the danger of demonizing Islam to further foreign
policy interests. Leon T. Hadar, former bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post,
predicted in 1992 that decisionmakers of American foreign policy would
create a new monolith to replace communism as a threat to the security of the
country. He warned against the creation of a "Green Peril":
The creation of a peril usually starts with mysterious "sources" and
unnamed officials who leak information, float trial balloons, and warn

330.
331.

Algeria Emerges as Test on Terror, FORWARD, Feb. 14, 1997, at I (quoting Daniel Pipes).
Daniel Pipes, There Are No Moderates: Dealing with FundamentalistIslam, NAT'L INTEREST,

Fall 1995.
332. Sam Vincent Meddis, Terror in Heartland,USA TODAY, April 20, 1995, at IA (quoting Daniel
Pipes). See also Applicant's Opposition to the Receipt into Evidence of the Expert Affidavits of Patrick
Clawson and Daniel Pipes at 4-5, Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178 for a full discussion of the
inaccuracy of Pipes' translations. In the section of his affidavit entitled "Justifying violence," Pipes
translates the Arabic word "Shar'i" as the adjectival form of the noun "Shari'a" or sacred law of Islam.
This is incorrect. Shar'i means legitimate. What Anwar Haddam had stated was that what is happening in
Algeria is legitimate armed struggle, not sacred war. In the same section, Pipes suggests that Haddam
justifies violence because "those so-called Islamic terrorists ... had been elected twice by their own
people." Pipes is attempting to suggest that the people who were elected in the Algerian elections like
Haddam, are the terrorists. Simply stated, he supports the government of Algeria in its effort to crush the
Islamic movement, including the Islamic party that swept the democratic elections in 1991. His quotations
of Haddam are inaccurate and misleading. In the section of his affidavit "Threatening Violence," he
quotes Haddam as saying the Algerian government will have to either agree to give way to the
establishment of an Islamic state, or that state will be "achieved by jihad." In fact, Haddam's actual
testimony was that the political solution he sought and the political solution he called for in the FIS official
positions was 'victory at the ballot box'. He testified that if armed struggle were to succeed, FIS would not
assume power based on armed victory, but would have to return to the ballot box. He testified that he
disagreed with the regimes in both Sudan and Iran for exactly this reason-that they had taken power by
force and not by elective mandate.
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about the coming threat. Those sources reflect debates and discussions
taking place within government. Their information is then augmented
by colorful intelligence reports that finger exotic and conspiratorial
terrorists and military advisers. Journalists then search for the named
and other villains. The media end up finding corroboration from foreign
sources who form an informal coalition with the sources in the US
government and help the press uncover further3 3 3information substantiating the threat coming from the new bad guys.
Of course, foreign policy considerations are not new to immigration decisions in the United States, and particularly not where refugee and asylum
policy is concerned. Critics have for decades criticized the obvious influence
on refugee and asylum decisions of foreign policy considerations, particularly during the influx of Central American, Cuban, and Haitian refugees.3 34
Another possible motivation is racism against Arabs. There is several
decades worth of evidence that immigration policies and procedures have
been motivated by institutionalized racism; 335 the most well-known example,
of course, is the treatment of Haitian refugees.33 6 Both racist and foreign
policy motivations have apparently provided impetus for the INS' deportation policies, with the cooperation at various times of Congress, the President, and the courts. 3 37

333. LEON T. HADAR, THE "GREEN PERIL": CREATING THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT, (Cato
Inst. Policy Analysis No. 177, 1992). See also Haddam Immigr Ct. I, supra note 178.
334. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS-REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S
HALF-OPEN DOOR 1945-PRESENT (1986).
335. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE

1960s TO THE 1980s (1986) (suggesting that "racializing" is a process that involves a community treating
some group as a different "race" because of cultural and other attributes that are seen as different from
those of whites). Arabs and Muslims can be characterized as being "racialized" in this way through
convenient labels of "terrorism" and stereotyping by the media. The author is grateful to Kevin Johnson
for this point.
336. Several commentators have pointed out the racial motivations of the selective policy against
Haitian asylum-seekers and refugees. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights published a detailed
study about the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program, designed to intercept and turn back Haitian
refugees and asylum-seekers before they entered U.S. territory. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAITAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT (1990). Professor Legomsky commented on the Lawyers Committee study: "From the
inception of the programme in 1981 until the time of the [Lawyers Committee] report (February 1990), the
United States interdicted 364 vessels on the high seas and returned more than 21,000 Haitians. Out of that
total, six Haitians were transported to the United States to apply for asylum ... Respected human rights
organizations have consistently documented the high incidence of grotesque human rights violations in
Haiti. Given those reports, one can be forgiven for asking whether the low success rate has less to do with
the merits of the claims than with the adequacy of the procedures." Stephen Legomsky, The Haitian

Interdiction Programme, Human Rights, and the Role of Judicial Protection, 2 INT'L. J. REFUGEE L.
182-83 (1990). See also Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations:A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 688-89 (1993); Joyce A. Hughes &
Linda P. Crane, Haitians:Seeking Refuge in the United States, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 747 (1993); Janice D.
Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking PoliticalAsylum in the United
States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1994).
337. See, Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the Executive Branch 's Pursuit of Foreign
Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the HaitianAsylum-Seekers, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993); Kathleen Newland, The Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy:A

1999]

TALES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION

Whatever the motivation for the government to target Arab and Muslim
groups in this way, the usual checks and balances against such abuse appear
to be singularly absent for the reasons detailed in this article. Unless
Congress 338 or the courts act to curb the excesses of the INS-working in
tandem with the FBI and using a cloak of secrecy over whatever evidence it
has to suggest a terrorist threat-Arabs and Muslims will continue to be
deprived of precious constitutional rights of free speech and association.
Moreover, if the INS succeeds in setting a precedent for the constitutionality
of the use of secret evidence against Arab and Muslim immigrants, the FBI
and the Department of Justice will have a freer hand to use secret evidence in
other contexts both against other immigrant groups and against U.S. citizens.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The government's strategies in the secret evidence cases compel the
conclusion that Arabs and Muslims are targeted for their beliefs and associations. The use of secret evidence, given new force after the 1996 legislation
of AEDPA and IIRIRA, is clearly the linchpin in the government's strategy to
exclude and deport based on its dislike of the political disposition of Muslim
and Arab groups in this country. The government's strategy appears to be
very carefully crafted to ensure that the use of secret evidence is playing out
primarily in the immigration courts and not the federal courts; in the former,
constitutional review is virtually nonexistent, and in the later, constitutional
review is minimal because of the effect of the judicial-review-stripping
legislation of 1996.
Most chilling for the civil liberties of these religious and ethnic groups is
that the confluence of factors reviewed in this article are having the effect of
guaranteeing that neither the courts nor Congress appear disposed to provide
any meaningful check on the INS and other administrative agencies' clear
institutional bias against Muslims and Arabs. What this means is that the
INS' rampant abuse of various protections in the immigration and other laws
affecting aliens' rights in the deportation and exclusion context is unchecked,
and ideological exclusion is once again alive and well, at least against
Muslims and Arabs in this country.

Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog? in THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED BORDERS 195, 199 (Michael S.
Teitelbaum & Myron Weiner eds. 1995).
338. On June 10, 1999, Representatives Bonior (D-MI) introduced the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of
1999. See H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (1999). As of November 13, 1999, there were 54 co-sponsors of the bill.
The proposed legislation would repeal the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings in the
following ways: (1) delete from current law the summary removal proceedings in secret court for so-called
terrorists established under AEDPA; (2) prohibit the government from denying an immigration benefit on
the basis of secret evidence; (3) prohibit the use of secret evidence to deny release of an alien on bond; (4)
prohibit the use of secret evidence to deny admission to returning lawful permanent residents; (5) in the
currently-pending cases, the bill would require the INS to either disclose the evidence to the alien or
withdraw the classified evidence from its proof in the case. See id.

